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At the Intersection of
Proximate Cause and Terrorism:
A Contextual Analysis of the (Proposed)
Restatement Third of Torts' Approach to
Intervening and Superseding Causes
BY JIM GASH*
INTRODUCTION
T his Article analyzes two key provisions of the proposed proximate
cause chapter of Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
Physical Harm ("Restatement Third"),' using the potential liability of the
airlines involved in the September 11 th tragedy as a vehicle for illustrating
how these provisions would operate and whether they are advisable.
September 11 th changed everything. The events of a single morning
created a world immeasurably more complicated and uncertain. The people
of the United States will not fully realize the social, psychological,
philosophical, and political implications of that day for several gener-
" Associate Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law. I want to give
special thanks to Professors Rick Cupp and Kris Knaplund for their helpful
comments on an earlier draft, and to research assistant Aaron Cain for his excellent
assistance. I am also grateful to Pepperdine University School of Law for funding
this Article through a summer research grant.
'See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (Basic
Principles) (Tentative Dtaft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002). At this point in time, the
proximate cause chapter to the Restatement Third is still in draft form. The
American Law Institute, has not yet considered as a body, much less voted on, the
specific language the Reporters propose. Formal discussion on this chapter will
likely begin at the ALI's annual meeting in May of 2003. The ALI will probably
not vote on this chapter until May of 2004. Discussions with the Advisors and the
Members Consultative Group for this project are currently ongoing. Interview with
Rick Cupp, Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, Member of
Members Consultative Group, Los Angeles, Cal. (Sept. 1, 2002).
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ations.2 Already, fears of subsequent attacks, together with the reduced
convenience, efficiency, and privacy resulting from tightened airport
security, have severely impacted air travel.' Many airlines and other
segments of the air travel industry have found it difficult, if not impossible,
to attain previous levels of profitability.4 Potentially even more devastating
for certain members of this industry, however, is the possibility of civil
liability for the catastrophic events of September 1 lth.
In the wake of September 1 lth, early calls succeeded in establishing
national solidarity.5 Responsibility for the attack was laid upon the Taliban
and the AI-Qaeda terrorist network.6 The overwhelming interest in
preserving the nation's focus and morale even motivated the National
Association of American Trial Lawyers to request a moratorium on civil
lawsuits arising out of the events of September 1 1th.7 Additionally,
Congress quickly passed legislation providing a fund for the immediate
financial relief for victims and their families for losses resulting from the
attacks.' The establishment of this fund had important implications for
those who opted to receive compensation. First, by only requiring victims
to demonstrate injury, rather than establish legal liability, the legislation
made recovery far easier and more efficient than it would be through the
judicial system. Second, Congress expressly precluded individuals opting
2See, e.g., Sharon Begley et al., Will We EverBe Safe Again, NEWSWEEK, Sept.
24, 2001, at 58 (suggesting several ways to make airports safer); Dana Hawkins,
Guarding Liberties as Well as Lives, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 8, 2001, at
56 (discussing technological tools and their effect on civil liberties); Tom
Kenworthy, Struggling to Create a Homeland Defense, USA TODAY, Oct. 9,2001,
at 1A (detailing changes in public perception since September 11 th and what
precautionary steps communities are taking).
' See Kim Clark & Joellen Perry, Blips in Your Trips, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Oct. 8,2001, at 41; Chris Woodyard, Airlines Say Waits in Line Shorter Now,
USA TODAY, Dec. 31, 2001, at lB.
4 See, e.g., Marilyn Adams, Bankruptcies Possible as Airlines' Losses
Continue, USATODAY, July 18,2002, at IB; Wendy Zellner, Airlines: How Ugly?,
Bus. WK., Jan. 14, 2002, at 124.
' See, e.g., Kenneth Auchincloss, We Shall Overcome, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24,
2001, at 18; Roger Simon et al., A Test of Will, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 1, 2001, at 6.
6 See, e.g., Kevin Whitelaw et al., Going After the Bad Guys, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Sept. 14, 2001, at-32.
' U.S. Lawyers' Group Urges Members to Postpone Suits, THE OTTAWA
CITIZEN, Sept. 15, 2001, at A2. This was the first request for such a moratorium in
the history of ATLA. Id.
8 September 11 Victims Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§
401-09, 115 Stat. 230 (2001).
91 Id. § 405(b)(2).
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to receive compensation through the fund from pursuing a separate legal
claim for damages against any other party for the harm caused by the
attack.10 In effect, Congress created very strong incentives for those injured
by the attack to keep the blame focused on the terrorists, rather than turning
toward more readily identifiable entities with deeper pockets, such as the
airlines whose planes were hijacked.
The amazing demonstration of unity immediately following September
11 th has, however, begun to splinter." While the military and intelligence
communities endeavor to locate Osama Bin Ladin and Al-Qaeda terrorists
abroad;" some members of the political and legal communities have sought
to hold domestic entities responsible, at least to some degree, for the attacks
at home. For example, some members of Congress have demanded
inquiries into whether the President acted appropriately before September
11 th in light of the information available. 3 Furthermore, having opted not
to seek compensation from the September 1 1th Victims Compensation
Fund, the first plaintiffs have come forward to file wrongful death lawsuits
against United and American Airlines for their roles in the September 1 lth
tragedy.'4 Assuming the plaintiffs can sufficiently demonstrate that the
airlines breached a duty of care, and that this breach was a factual cause of
the damages, the issue of proximate cause still places a significant obstacle
in the plaintiffs' road to recovery. The outcome of these suits may turn on
the legal question of how to treat intervening culpable acts in the proximate
'0 Id. §405(c)(3)(B)(i).
1 See Editorial, A Matter of Time; So Much for Moratorium on Terror
Lawsuits, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 17, 2002, at B-10:I; Tim O'Brien,
Cracks in the Plaintiff Bar's Solidarity, N.J. L.J., Jan. 28, 2002, at Al.
"2 See, e.g., Rod Nordland et al., Pakistan: Secret Hunt, Elusive Prey,
NEWSWEEK, May 13, 2002, at 32; Andrea Stone, British Forces Join Huntfor Al-
Qaeda, USA TODAY, Apr. 17, 2002, at A8.
'3 See, e.g., Howard Fineman, "I Sniff Some Politics, "NEWSWEEK, May 27,
2002, at 37-38.
14 Mariani v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11628 (AKH), 2002 WL
1685382 (S.D.N.Y. July 24,2002); Gail Appleson, American Airlines Suedfor $50
Million in WTC Attack (Apr. 9, 2002), at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/
news/662229/posts. While the lawsuit against United was actually brought by the
survivors of one of the passengers on United Flight 175, the lawsuit against
American was brought by the survivors of someone killed while working in the
World Trade Center. This article focuses on this latter category of plaintiffs. In
addition, a group of plaintiffs recently filed a one trillion dollar lawsuit against
foreign governments and private entities alleged to have participated in the funding
of terrorism. See Nicholas M. Horrock, Trillion-Dollar Lawsuit May Reveal More
(Aug. 18, 2002), at http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20020818-082901 -
8164r.htm.
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cause analysis. More specifically, courts will have to decide whether the
intervening terrorist acts responsible for the tragedy are properly viewed as
superseding causes, thus relieving the airlines of liability regardless of
whether the plaintiffs can prove the airlines breached a duty of due care.
Less than a week before September 11 th, the Restatement Third
Reporters15 distributed a draft of the proposed chapter on proximate
cause. 6 Proximate cause has rightfully earned its reputation as one of the
most difficult and complicated topics in modem law. While the events of
the following weeks would make the world immeasurably more compli-
cated, the purpose of this draft was to make the tort world immeasurably
less complicated-at least for first year law students, torts professors, trial
judges, and trial lawyers. 7
Chapter 6 of the Restatement Third lays out proximate cause"8 in six
sections.' 9 This Article analyzes the treatment of intervening culpable acts
S The Restatement Third Reporters are Gary T. Schwartz, Michael D. Green,
and William C. Powers. Professor Schwartz tragically died in mid-2001. Torts
Reporter Gary Schwartz Is Dead at 61, THE ALI REPORTER (Summer 2001), at
www.ali.org/ali/R2304_Schwartz/htm.
16 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (Tentative
Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002).
'" See FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.1, at 86 (2d ed.
1986) ("The result has been a widely recognized confusion, and as luxuriant a crop
of legal literature as is to be had in any branch of tort law."). See also W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at 263 (5th ed. 1984)
("There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more
disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion.");
STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 11:1, at 380 (1986)
(" 'The concept of legal causation has given the courts and commentators
consummate difficulty and has in truth defied precise definition."' (quoting Justice
Tobriner's opinion in State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acci. Com., 176
Cal. App. 2d 10, 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959))). My colleagues who teach first year
Property may persuasively argue that the Rule Against Perpetuities is equally
difficult and complex. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 690-91 (Cal. 1961)
(finding Rule Against Perpetuities so difficult that lawyer's failure to apply it
correctly was not grounds for malpractice).
"8 Interestingly, one of the most notable changes in proximate cause proposed
by the Reporters is the elimination of that term. "Although the term 'proximate
cause' has been in widespread use in judicial opinions, treatises, casebooks, and
scholarship, the term is not generally employed in this Chapter because it is an
especially poor one to describe the idea to which it is connected." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26, special note on proximate
cause (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002).
9 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM §§ 29-
34 (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002). Section 29 states the general rule for
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in proximate cause analysis under Section 33 of the Restatement Third.
Because Section 33 incorporates the general proximate cause analysis
urged in Section 29, Part I of this Article analyzes Section 29 to provide the
necessary foundation for the analysis of Section 33.2° A series of charts and
graphs illustrates the fundamental concepts underlying proximate cause.
Part H1 traces the historical evolution of courts' analyses of proximate cause
when intervening acts combine with an actor's tortious conduct to cause
harm.2 Over time, three approaches to intervening cause cases have
emerged; the latest (and best) is the approach urged by the Restatement
Third. Finally, Part m analyzes the September 11 th fact pattern under each
of the three approaches to intervening cause analysis to ascertain whether
the likely outcome will depend upon whether or not the courts trying these
cases adopt the Restatement Third approach.22
I. THE RESTATEMENT THIRD'S DEFINITION OF
AND APPROACH TO PROXIMATE CAUSE
While this Article's primary purpose is to evaluate the Restatement
Third's treatment of intervening culpable acts under Section 33, a
secondary purpose is to conceptualize and graphically illustrate the general
approach to proximate cause outlined in Section 29. This foundation is
essential because Section 33 rejects the traditional application of special
rules when an intervening act occurs, preferring instead a straightforward
application of Section 29's general approach to proximate cause.23 Conse-
limiting liability, reducing the analysis to a determination of whether the risk of the
harm actually suffered was a risk which made the actor's conduct tortious. Section
30 deals with liability for harm to "eggshell plaintiffs," holding tortfeasors liable
for harm of a greater magnitude or of a different type than might reasonably be
expected when it results partly from a plaintiff's preexisting physical or mental
condition. Section 31 addresses the "rescue doctrine," holding an actor liable for
harm to persons coming to the aid of one originally imperiled by the actor's tortious
conduct. Section 32 advocates holding intentional or reckless tortfeasors liable for
a broader range of harms than a mere negligent tortfeasor. Section 33 addresses the
treatment of liability when an intervening act occurs after an actor's tortious
conduct that is also a factual cause of the harm. Finally, Section 34 deals with
liability for the aggravation of harm to a plaintiff caused by attempts to render aid
reasonably required by the initial injury.20 See infra notes 23-152 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 153-257 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 258-302 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
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quently, this Article analyzes Section 29 in some detail before turning to
Section 33's treatment of intervening acts.
A. Background of Proximate Cause
No one, it seems, likes the term "proximate cause."24 Like the Reporters
for the Restatement of the Law of Torts25 ("Restatement First") and
Restatement (Second) of Torts 6 ("Restatement Second"), the Restatement
Third Reporters are no exception--"There may be no legal term in as
widespread usage as proximate cause that has been excoriated as it has. 27
Lord Chancellor Baron first coined the term in 1630,28 and has since
received much scorn as a consequence.2 9
Despite its nearly uniform use by courts,3" the Restatement First
avoided using the term "proximate cause," preferring instead the term
"legal cause."'" Notably, instead of clearly breaking the issue of causation
into separate determinations of factual cause32 and proximate cause, the
24 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 29,
reporters' note cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002) (collecting and
quoting legions of critical statements about the proximate cause term).
23 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS (1934).
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS (1965).
27 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 29
Reporters' Note cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002).
28 See" 'Injure non remota causa, sedproxima, spectatur.' ('In law look to the
proximate, not remote cause.')." Stasia Mosesso, Note, Up in Smoke: How the
Proximate Cause Battle Extinguished the Tobacco War, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
257, 284 n.177 (2000) (quoting FRANCIS BACON, Maxims of the Law, in THE
WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 327 (J. Spedding et al. eds., 1879)).
. 29 See, e.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 244 (4th ed. 1971)
(categorizing Bacon's coining of proximate cause as "sin[ ]").
30 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26,
special note on proximate cause (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002).
3! See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 9 (1934) ("The words 'legal
cause' are used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote the fact that
the manner in which the actor's tortious conduct has resulted in an invasion of
some legally protected interest of another is such that the law regards it just to hold
the actor responsible for such harm."). The comments to Section 9 then direct the
reader to later specific provisions further illuminating the legal cause analysis. Id.
§ 9 cmt. b (directing the reader to Sections 279 and 280 and Sections 430-53).
Section 431 describes what constitutes legal cause in the negligence context. Id.32 The term "factual cause" is the one used by the Restatement Third to describe
what has been variously referred to in the past as "but-for cause" and "cause in
fact." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26
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Restatement First used the term "legal cause" to encompass both factual
cause and proximate cause.33
The Restatement Second, initially published in 1965, likewise avoided
using "proximate cause," opting instead to retain the "legal cause"
terminology from the Restatement First with only minor semantic
modifications. Once again, rather than separating the analytically distinct
fact-bound factual cause inquiry from the policy-driven proximate cause
inquiry, the Restatement Second perpetuated the confusing conflation of
these concepts utilized by the Restatement First.
35
Finally, in 1977, in conjunction with a new Chapter addressing
misrepresentation, Restatement Second Reporter Dean John Wade
endeavored to sever factual cause from what we know as proximate cause.36
Wade nevertheless eschewed the more popular "proximate cause"
terminology in favor of retaining "legal cause, 37 though now that term
purported to refer only to the proximate cause aspect of causation. 8
For a variety of reasons, the Restatement term "legal cause" never
gained much traction with courts or commentators.39 Likewise, the concepts
cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002) ("The standard for factual causation
in this section is familiarly referred to as the 'but-for' test, as well as the sine qua
non test. Both express the same concept: an act is a factual cause of an outcome if,
in the absence of the act, the outcome would not have occurred.").
31 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 9 (1934).
31 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 9 (1965). See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. a
(Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002) ("The definition provided for 'legal cause'
in the Second Restatement differed modestly from the first Restatement by adding
that it addressed the 'causal sequence' between an actor's tortious conduct-and the
invasion of a legally protected interest.").
3' The section describing what constitutes legal cause in the negligence context
was not changed at all. Compare RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 431
(1934) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
36 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 546 (1965)
(entitled "Causation in Fact") with id. § 548A (entitled "Legal Causation of
Pecuniary Loss"). Dean Wade's reference to the substantial factor test in the
context of factual, rather than proximate, cause lends credence to the view that the
earlier Restatements intended for that test to be part of the factual cause inquiry.
See id. § 546.
3 See id. § 548A.
38 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26
cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002).
31 See, e.g., id. ("Despite the venerability of the 'legal cause' term in Restate-
ment history, it has not been widely adopted in judicial and legal discourse nor is
it helpful in explicating the ground that it covers."). See also id., Special Note On
2002-20031
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advocated by Restatement First and Restatement Second fared equally
poorly with the judicial system.4" For example, the Restatement Second
asserted that an actor's conduct was not to be considered to be a legal cause
of harm when "after the event and looking back from the harm to the
actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary that
it should have brought about the harm."4 1 This "highly-extraordinary-in-
hindsight" test never gained significant support.42
B. The Restatement Third Approach to Proximate Cause
The Restatement Third attempts to break from earlier tradition with
respect to the causation aspect of torts restatements by actually attempting
to restate the law as it is applied by courts.43 It is only partially successful.
While the Restatement Third successfully completes the transition from a
unitary concept of "legal cause" advocated by earlier Restatements to the
bifurcated factual and proximate cause approach utilized today," it
stubbornly refuses to adopt the prevailing "proximate cause" terminology.45
Proximate Cause ("[D]espite 70 years of Torts Restatement commitment to legal
cause, its acceptance in the vocabulary of tort law is quite minimal.").
4 See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Proximate Cause, the Proposed Basic Principles
Restatement, and Products Liability, 53 S.C. L. REv. 1085, 1086-87 (2002)
("Neither the first nor the second Restatements faithfully reflected the language or,
in some respects, the approaches utilized by the courts, and the Restatements'
efforts to steer the courts to new language and approaches met with failure.").
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965).
42 See Cupp, supra note 40, at 1086.
13 Much controversy has centered on whether a restatement should encourage
legal reform, or should merely restate the present state of the law. See, e.g., Shirley
S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and the American
Law Institute, Thomas E. Fairchild Lecture, University of Wisconsin Law School
(Oct. 28, 1994), in 1995 WIS. L. REv. 1, 20-24 (1995) (discussing whether
restatements of black-letter law should focus on the" 'is' or" 'ought"'").
" Indeed, the Restatement Third goes so far as to place factual cause and legal
cause into separate chapters. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 (entitled "Factual Cause") (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar.
25, 2002) with id. § 32 (entitled "Scope of Liability (Proximate Cause)").
" See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS ch. 6, Special Note On Proximate
Cause (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002) ("Although the term 'proximate
cause' has been in widespread use in judicial opinions, treatises, casebooks, and
scholarship, the term is not generally employed in this Chapter because it is an
especially poor one to describe the idea to which it is connected .... Nevertheless,
to communicate clearly with judges, lawyers, and academics who understand
limitations on liability under the proximate-cause rubric, the term is included in a
parenthetical following the Chapter's title.").
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Moreover, while the substance of the Restatement Third might accurately
reflect the prevailing analytical approach to proximate cause, the terminol-
ogy utilized is outside the mainstream.46
Under the Restatement Third, both factual cause and proximate cause
are simply defined:
§ 26. Factual Cause
An actor's tortious conduct must be a factual cause of another's physical
harm for liability to be imposed. Conduct is a factual cause of harm when
the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct. Tortious conduct
may also be a factual cause of harm under § 27.
§ 29. Limitations on Liability for Tortious Conduct4 8
An actor is not liable for harm different from the harms whose risks made
the actor's conduct tortious.
49
Although the Restatement Third approach refuses to employ the
"proximate cause" terminology and avoids the prevailing "foreseeability"
language, it does have the virtue of being succinct and simple. 0 It is also
" See Cupp, supra note 40, at 1087, 1090 ("[I]f a restatement embraces too
much linguistic or doctrinal creativity... it risks irrelevance .... [C]oncem over
irrelevance could be eliminated by switching the black-letter rule to reasonable
foreseeability, and emphasizing result-within-the-risk language heavily in the
comments.").
41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26
(Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002). The caveat at the end of Section 26
referencing Section 27 clarifies that tortious conduct that one may not think is a
factual cause under Section 26 simply because another competing causal sequence
would have also caused the harm is still to be treated as a factual cause. This
harkens back to the classic case where two fires of separate origin combine to bum
a single structure; both fires are considered factual causes of the harm even though
either alone would have been sufficient to cause the harm, even though technically
speaking neither are a factual cause of the harm. See Anderson v. Minneapolis, 179
N.W. 45, 49 (Minn. 1920); see also Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863
S.W.2d 852, 861 (Mo. 1993), aff'd, 901 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. App. 1995); Hughey v.
Candoli, 323 P.2d 779, 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
18 Though not apparent from its title, this is the section that addresses proximate
cause.
4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 29
(Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002).
so In principle, I agree that the proximate cause terminology is unhelpful and
even confusing to juries. But since that terminology is in such widespread use, the
advances made by the Restatement Third in the justification for and simplification
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more precise than the generalized "foreseeability" language often used by
courts, and is appealing for that reason. To be dutifully applied, one need
only engage in a straightforward three-step inquiry.5' The first question is:
What types of harm did an actor's conduct reasonably risk at the time of the
allegedly tortious conduct?52 The second question is: Was the type of harm
actually caused to another one of the types of harm identified in question
one? If the answer to the second question is affirmative, then the third and
final question is: Was the harm actually suffered sufficiently probable to
occur, and sufficiently grave if it did occur, so as to render the actor's
conduct tortious? If so, proximate cause exists and liability is imposed; if
not, proximate cause does not exist and no liability is imposed. What
follows is a conceptual illustration of why the Restatement Third approach
is that simple and an explanation of how it works when applied to the facts
of a case.
1. The Roots of Modern Proximate Cause Analysis
Any worthwhile discussion of proximate cause necessarily addresses
the seminal case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.53 Justice
Cardozo's majority opinion in that case forms the foundation of legitimate
proximate cause analysis. In contrast to some other scholars,54 I believe that
the Restatement Third approach essentially vindicates the correctness of
Justice Cardozo's analysis in Palsgraf, albeit with an important modifica-
tion of its nomenclature. While the terminology used by the Restatement
Third differs from that used in Palsgraf, the two approaches (in the final
analysis) are functionally quite similar. The facts of Palsgrafwill serve as
the backdrop to illustrate the Restatement Third's approach to proximate
cause and to demonstrate that it does not materially differ in substance from
the analysis employed in that case.
of the concept it represents risk being ignored because of the refusal to use that
terminology.
"' This, of course, presupposes a prior finding of tortious conduct (i.e., breach
of some legally prescribed duty).
52 While "reasonably" is not expressly written into the black-letter, that concept
is implicit in the requirement that that the conduct be tortious. See generally infra
at Part I.B. 1.b.
" Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).54 See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Passing ofPalsgraf?, 54 VAND. L. REv. 803,
803 (2001) (suggesting that the Restatement Third, if adopted, will have killed the
Palsgraf analysis).
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a. Justice Cardozo 's Analysis in Palsgraf
In Palsgraf, two men ran toward a moving train, attempting to board."
While one safely climbed onto the train, the other lost his balance and
dropped a small package wrapped in newspaper. As it turned out, the
package contained fireworks, which exploded when they landed on the
tracks. The concussion from the explosion caused a scale to strike Mrs.
Palsgraf while she was standing on the far end of the train station platform.
The trial court found that the negligence of the train employees in assisting
the man aboard actually caused the package to fall onto the tracks.56
Writing for the majority, Justice Cardozo resolved the case on grounds
other than proximate cause, insisting that causation (let alone proximate
cause) had nothing to do with this case. He stated that "[t]he law of
causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case before us."57
Instead, Justice Cardozo opted to analyze the case in the context of whether
or not the train employee breached a duty to Mrs. Palsgraf." The scope of
the duty owed, according to Justice Cardozo, was a function of the risk
presented by the allegedly tortious conduct: "The risk reasonably to be
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk
to another or to others within the range of apprehension."59 The reasonably
perceived risks in this situation were fairly limited. Included among those
perceived risks, for example, was the risk that the man trying to board the
train could fall and suffer personal injury or that the contents of the
package could fall from his grasp and break upon impact with the track. It
might even be reasonably foreseeable that what was in the package could
damage the track.
To Justice Cardozo, this risk inquiry could be illustrated spatially by
imagining spheres of danger within which liability could be imposed, and
outside of which liability could not be imposed.60 Accordingly, the critical
inquiry to Justice Cardozo was whether a scale being knocked down and
55 Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99.
16 Id. at 101.
57 Id.
58 Justice Cardozo even openly questioned whether the train employee actually
breached a duty of care to the man he was helping onto the train. See id. at 100 ("If
there was a wrong to [the man carrying the package] at all, which may very well be
doubted, it was a wrong to a property interest only, the safety of his package.").
59 Id. (citation omitted).
60 See id. (referring to what he called the "orbit of danger" and "orbit of duty"
as defining the scope of responsibility); see also id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting)
(characterizing Justice Cardozo's approach as creating a "radius of danger").
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onto someone standing on the platform was among the risks reasonably
posed by helping a passenger carrying a package wrapped in newspaper
board a moving train, even if doing so could be abstractly characterized as
wrongful. As found by Justice Cardozo, the answer was clearly "no. 61
Under Justice Cardozo's approach, the analysis mandates that the
action be immediately frozen at the point of the allegedly tortious
conduct-something akin to taking a legal snapshot. At that point, the
"orbit of danger" can be constructed by ascertaining what risks are
reasonably posed by that conduct. 62 The risks reasonably posed by the
conduct, thus falling within the "orbit of danger," then define the "orbit of
duty. ' 63 Consequently, if harm of the type reasonably risked by the
allegedly tortious conduct is caused to one within the "orbit of danger,"
then a duty has been breached and liability can be imposed. If, however, the
harm caused does not fall within the "orbit of danger," then no duty has
been breached and liability cannot be imposed.'
Under the facts of Palsgraf, the legal snapshot taken at the precise
moment of the conduct alleged to be tortious would depict a train employee
pulling a man into a moving train while a newspaper-wrapped package
hangs in suspended animation just above the tracks below. Since the risks
reasonably posed by the train employee's conduct (the "orbit of danger")
did not include causing a scale to fall onto someone on the platform, Mrs.
Palsgraf did not fall within the "orbit of duty" owed by the train employee.
Accordingly, there was no liability.
61 Id. at 99 ("Relatively to [plaintiff] it was not negligence at all. Nothing in the
situation gave notice that the falling package had in it the potency of peril to
persons thus removed.").621Id. at 100.
63 Id.
6 To be precise, Justice Cardozo focused on whether the plaintiff was within
the sphere of danger, rather than whether the type of harm ultimately caused was
within that sphere. As recognized in the Restatement Third, however, there is little,
if any, practical distinction between determining whether the plaintiff was within
the scope of risk and whether the type of harm suffered by that plaintiff was within
the scope of risk:
[M]ost often the scope-of-liability issue does not involve the problem posed
in Palsgraf, that is, where the plaintiff was outside the scope of harm.
Rather, most cases involve persons within the foreseeable scope of some
harm but who have suffered other har..... In short, an unforeseeable-
plaintiff rule is not terribly helpful in addressing most scope-of-liability
issues.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 29, cmt d.
(Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002).
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Justice Cardozo's majority opinion characterizes the ultimate legal
question as one of duty, and not proximate cause.65 Consequently, Justice
Cardozo uses duty-based terminology throughout his opinion. In his
dissent, Justice Andrews argues that one owes a duty of care to all, and not
only to foreseeable plaintiffs, 66 as Justice Cardozo argued.67 It seems that
with all the dust settled, Andrews won the battle, but Cardozo won the war.
Modem courts routinely hold, and the Restatement Third urges, that
actors owe a generalized duty of due care with regard to physical harm that
is not tied to a specific foreseeable person or group of people.68 Accord-
ingly, Andrews won that battle--Cardozo's limited view of the scope of
duty owed has been rejected. However, more importantly, Cardozo's
approach to what he deemed the "orbit of duty" has re-emerged with a new
name, the "scope of risk," which is urged by the Restatement Third as the
preferred test for proximate cause. 69 This is the more important "war"
because Cardozo's approach ultimately determines the outcome of the case.
This is true because a finding of a breach of a generalized duty of due care
(Andrews) is utterly worthless to a plaintiff without an additional finding
that such a breach caused an injury that was within the "scope of risk"
(Cardozo) created by that breach of duty.
While Justice Cardozo's analysis is ultimately substantively correct, it
still lacks a certain depth of foundation. In particular, Justice Cardozo fails
to explain how one determines what risks are "reasonably to be perceived."
His analysis thus fails to provide the tools with which to ascertain the
borders of the so-called "orbit of duty." This is where the Restatement
Third succeeds, at least partially. It takes Justice Cardozo's visual image
and distills it to its legal core-it provides the rationale for the result by
illuminating the foundation for the argument. It shows why Justice
65 Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99-100.
66 Id. at 102 (Andrews, J. dissenting).
67Id. at 100.
68 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM § 7 (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002).
69 As discussed earlier, Justice Cardozo focused more on the foreseeability of
the plaintiff than on the foreseeability of the harm caused. See supra note 64. This
fine distinction, however, is without significance in the vast majority of cases.
Accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 29,
cmt. n (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002) ("Ordinarily, the risk standard
contained in this section will, without requiring any separate reference to the
foreseeability of the plaintiff, preclude liability for harm to such plaintiffs."); id.
("Generally, application of the risk standard should avoid much of the need for
consideration of unforeseeable plaintiffs.").
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Cardozo's approach is right. The Restatement Thirdtakes Justice Cardozo's
imagery and separates it into its component parts so that it is more easily
understood and is legally legitimized. This Article further expounds upon
the Restatement Third's language by graphically illustrating the principles
that animate the proximate cause inquiry, further demystifying proximate
cause.
b. The Core of Proximate Cause: B<PL
A few years after Palsgraf Judge Learned Hand taught us that an actor
fails to act as an average reasonable person when the probability of harm
risked by certain conduct multiplied by the gravity of the harm risked by
that conduct outweighs the burden of not engaging in that conduct.70 This
is the familiar B<PL formula.7 This formula is used to ascertain whether
an actor has breached a duty of due care (i.e., whether the actor's conduct
fell below the standard of care of a reasonably prudent person).72 To fully
understand the Restatement Third's approach to proximate cause, one first
must fully understand and appreciate why the B<PL formula is used to
determine breach. Only then can one take the additional step toward
understanding when and why liability is not imposed, even when a breach
of the duty of care factually causes damages.
In ascertaining whether an actor's conduct is tortious, the conduct is
compared to that of the hypothetical reasonably prudent person. The law
assumes that this reasonably prudent person, prior to engaging in any
particular conduct, evaluates the risks posed by that conduct and balances
those risks against the utility to be gained by engaging in such con-
70See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
7' Under Hand's formula, B represents the burden to the actor of taking
adequate precautions, P represents the probability of harm resulting from the
actor's conduct, and L represents the gravity of harm risked by the actor's conduct.
Id.
72 1 am not contending that Judge Learned Hand's formula is always overtly
used by juries in deciding the dispositive question of whether the defendant fell
below the standard of care of the average reasonable person. That is actually
usually not the case. See, e.g., McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1557
(7th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[o]rdinarily... the parties do not give the jury the
information required to quantify the variables that the Hand Formula picks out as
relevant. That is why the formula has greater analytic than operational signifi-
cance."). Nevertheless, as Judge Posner points out in McCarty, there is no
substantive difference between the reasonable person standard and the Hand
formula. See id.
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duct."3 If the risks of harm posed by the conduct outweigh the utility of
engaging in that conduct, then the reasonably prudent person will necessar-
ily not engage in the conduct. Consequently, if an actor does engage in such
conduct and causes harm, the law declares the conduct to be negligent and
the actor to be liable for the harm."4 As discussed above, the mechanism
used to compare the risk to the utility is the B<PL formula. Generally
speaking, the PL represents the risk and the B represents the utility."5
Therefore, if the PL (risk) is greater than the B (utility), then the actor fails
the test and is found to have breached a duty of care because the actor has
not acted as a reasonably prudent person.
This formula and the reasonably prudent person standard it animates
are necessary evaluative tools because all conduct engaged in by people
carries with it some risk of harm to others and/or their interests. If merely
engaging in conduct that posed some risk of harm sufficed to support a
finding of liability, then ours would be a system of strict liability. But
because we want to encourage conduct that maximizes efficiency, a certain
amount of risk is tolerable and even encouraged."6 The task of the B<PL
formula is, then, to draw the line between acceptable risk and unacceptable
risk. A simple hypothetical will serve to illustrate how and where that line
gets drawn.
c. A Simple Illustration of the Breach of Duty Inquiry
Assume a traveling salesman purchases a new car, and assume he only
drives that car over a set route between Los Angeles, California, and Waco,
Texas, which is roughly 3000 miles round-trip of desert highway. When the
salesman takes his first trip from Los Angeles to Waco, there is a very
small risk that one of the tires will fail from excess wear, thus causing a
deadly accident on the highway. When the salesman takes his second trip,
"3 The Restatement Second actually preferred what is called the risk-utility test
to evaluate whether particular conduct amounted to a breach of a duty of due care.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 292-93 (1965). In contrast,
the Restatement Third falls into line with the vast majority of case law and
scholarly commentary and adopts the B<PL test. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002).
Both tests are designed to yield the same results.
74 This is subject, of course, to the proximate cause limitations discussed below.
75 More accurately, B represents the burden of sacrificing the utility of engaging
in the particular conduct.
76 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed.
1986).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the tires now have 3000 miles on them and the risk of tire failure increases
slightly. In B<PL terms, the P (probability of harm) has increased
incrementally. With each subsequent trip, the probability increases that one
of the tires will wear out and fail, thus causing a deadly accident on the
highway. At some point in time, a reasonably prudent person in the same
situation would no longer tolerate the risk of tire failure and would replace
the tires. Prior to that moment in time, the salesman will not be breaching
a duty of care by driving on the tires that came with the car. However, at
the precise moment that a reasonably prudent person would change the tires
(and from that point forward), any additional driving will be a breach of the
duty of care. This can be illustrated in the table below,77 and in the
accompanying graph.7"
TABLE 1:
Trip # Miles Burden of Probability Gravity of Potential
Already Buying New of Tire Fail- Harm 81
Driven Tires '9 ure (in per-
on Tires cent)
°80
1 0 $100 .0009 Death/serious injury
2 3,000 $100 .0019 Death/serious injury
3 6,000 $100 .0031 Death/serious injury
4 9,000 $100 .0045 Death/serious injury
5 12,000 $100 .0061 Death/serious injury
6 15,000 $100 .0079 Death/serious injury
7 18,000 $100 .0099 Death/serious injury
77 See Table 1.
78 See Graph 1.
79 For the sake of simplifying the illustration, I am assuming that four new tires
will cost $100, which is probably a slight underestimation. I also understand that
part of the burden calculus includes the amount of time and energy the salesman
would have to expend in having the tires changed. For the sake of simplicity, that
burden is not monetarily quantified.
80 These probability numbers are strictly estimates on my part based upon my
discussion with a student named Caleb Frigerio who used to be a mechanic.
Interview with Caleb Frigerio, former mechanic, in Malibu, Cal. (Sept. 4, 2002).
They are illustrative only and do not purport to be scientifically calculated.
81 The gravity of harm will ultimately have to be reduced to a dollar figure, as
is done below. See Table 2. For purposes of illustrating how the B<PL test works,
however, I am postponing adding this additional layer of complexity.
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8 21,000 $100 .0121 Death/serious injury
9 24,000 $100 .0145 Death/serious injury
10 27,000 $100 .0173 Death/serious injury
11 30,000 $100 .0201 Death/serious injury
12 33,000 $100 .0231 Death/serious injury
13 36,000 $100 .0263 Death/serious injury
14 39,000 $100 .0299 Death/serious injury
15 42,000 $100 .0335 Death/serious injury
16 45,000 $100 .0373 Death/serious injury
17 48,000 $100 .0413 Death/serious injury
18 51,000 $100 .0457 Death/serious injury
19 54,000 $100 .0503 Death/serious injury
20 57,000 $100 .0551 Death/serious injury
In this hypothetical, P is the only variable in the equation that changes
as the probability (in percentages) that a tire will wear out and fail
increases; B and L are being held constant. B is constant because the price
of replacing the tires represents the burden on the salesman, and precisely
when those tires are purchased will not materially affect the price.82 L is
constant because the gravity of harm risked (deadly accident) is the same
regardless of when the tire failure occurs. In contrast, the probability of tire
failure rises as the number of miles driven increases. Therefore, to
determine at what point a breach of the duty of care occurs in this
hypothetical, one must ascertain the point at which the risk of harm changes
from acceptable to unacceptable. At that point, the burden will exactly
equal the probability of harm multiplied by the gravity of harm (B=PL).
For purposes of this illustration, assume that a reasonably prudent
person would tolerate a .02 percent level of risk (1 in 5000 chance) of
causing a serious or deadly accident, but no higher. Accordingly, after
taking ten trips and traveling 30,000 miles, the reasonably prudent person
would purchase new tires. This means that the salesman would not be
breaching a duty of care with respect to the tires on any of the first ten trips
(when B>PL), but would be breaching such a duty of care if he proceeded
with Trip 11 without replacing the tires (when B<PL).
If one of his tires fails due to excess wear during one of his first ten
trips, then he would not be liable because he had not breached a duty. If,
82 One could factor inflation into the equation for more precision, but that
would likely be very minimal.
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however, one of the tires fails during his eleventh Trip (or during any of the
subsequent trips), he would have breached a duty of care.
This can be graphically illustrated in two ways. First, a simple line
graph with the mileage driven as the X-axis and the magnitude of risk as
the Y-axis can show how the risk increases over time.83
As depicted in the graph, as the number of trips taken and miles driven
increases, the magnitude of risk rises. At some point in time, the magnitude
of risk changes from an acceptable level to an unacceptable level. This
change occurs when the tire failure risk curve crosses the point at which
B=PL. This is illustrated in Graph 2.84
83 See Graph 1.
84See Graph 2.
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While the line graphs serve to illustrate the changing levels of risk over
time, the question of whether an actor has breached a duty of care is
typically answered by considering a particular moment in time. This
illustrates what has been referred to earlier as a "legal snapshot. 8 5 In other
words, the actor's conduct must be judged at the point in time that the
allegedly tortious conduct occurs.8 6 When the allegedly tortious conduct is
considered over time, then a legal snapshot can be taken at any point along
the risk curve to ascertain whether, at that particular moment, the actor is
breaching a duty of care.
To illustrate, assume that one of the tires fails during Trip 8 and causes
serious injury to another person who sues the salesman alleging negligent
failure to maintain his tires. A legal snapshot can be taken just before Trip
85 See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
16 In some cases, the time at which to take the legal snapshot is perfectly clear,
such as in Palsgrafwhen the train employee reached down to help the passenger
onto the train. In other situations, such as the one serving as the illustration here,
the time at which to take the legal snapshot is not so clear because the allegedly
tortious act involves a pattern of conduct (or lack of conduct), rather than a certain
moment.
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8, when the salesman has driven 21,000 miles.87 At this point, the burden
of purchasing new tires is higher than the magnitude of risk (probability of
harm multiplied by gravity of harm) associated with driving on the same
tires. Accordingly, the salesman has not breached a duty of care and should
prevail on the claim brought by the injured party. This can be graphically
illustrated on the line graph used previously.
88
GRAPH 3:
Risk of Tire Blowout Before Trip 8
-Tire Blow
B = PL
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Trip #
While examining the legal snapshot on a line graph can be helpful, a bar
graph can even more effectively illustrate the proper analysis.8 9
87 While the legal snapshot can be taken at any point during any given trip, for
ease of illustration, I will use the beginning of each trip as the point at which to
take this snapshot.
8 See Graph 3.
89 See Graph 4.
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GRAPH 4:
Legal Snapshot of Risk of Blowout Before Trip 8
Tire Blout
B =PL
Type of Risk
This bar graph illustrates that at the particular point in time, prior to
leaving on Trip 8, the level of risk posed by not changing the tires is less
than the burden of changing the tires. This explains why the risk block9"
does not rise to the level of the B=PL line.
90 The term "risk block" rather than "risk bar" is used because later in this
Article, I use the imagery of stacking and unstacking blocks to illustrate the
difference between the breach of duty and proximate cause inquiries. See infra
notes 137-52 and accompanying text.
2002-2003]
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Now assume instead that the tire failure and serious accident occurs
during Trip 12. A legal snapshot taken just before Trip 12, when the
salesman has driven 33,000 miles, would reveal that at this point, the
burden of purchasing new tires is less than the magnitude of risk associated
with driving on the same tires.91 Accordingly, the salesman has breached
a duty of care and should lose in a claim brought by the injured party. Once
again, this can be more effectively illustrated on a bar graph.92
9' See Graph 5.
92 See Graph 6.
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GRAPH 6:
Legal S naphot of Risk of Blowout Before Trip 12
As shown, the level of risk posed by not changing the tires is now
greater than the burden of changing the tires. This explains why the risk
block rises above the level of the B=PL line. The chart and these graphs
illustrate how one determines whether an actor has breached a duty of care
to another.93 Nonetheless, as discussed and illustrated below, not all
breaches that factually cause harm warrant the imposition of liability.
Discerning between breaches that give rise to liability and those that do not
is the function of proximate cause, or "scope of liability" as preferred by
the Restatement Third.94 While proximate cause seems to most people to be
93 I understand and appreciate that in the vast majority of cases the breach
inquiry is multi-factored and more complicated than in this illustration. In fact, the
next section of this Article increases the level of complexity. Nevertheless, the core
components of the breach inquiry remain the same.
94 The general proximate cause analysis will serve, in turn, as the foundation for
the analysis in Restatement Third Section 33, which discusses how intervening
causes affect the general proximate cause analysis. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 33 (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25,
2002).
I TireBlo ut
B = PL
Type of Risk
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much more complicated than the breach analysis embodied in the B<PL
test, when distilled, proximate cause is little more than a deconstruction of
the individual risks that are the building blocks with which the B<PL test
is constructed. Once again, the hypothetical traveling salesman will serve
to illustrate this argument.
d. A Simple Illustration of the Proximate Cause Inquiry
As before, assume our traveling salesman purchases a new car and that
he only drives that car over a set route between Los Angeles and Waco,
which is roughly 3000 miles round-trip of desert highway. Also, assume
that the car comes with a maintenance agreement that covers any and all
necessary repairs for the first 60,000 miles of driving, with the only cost
being a $100 flat fee for each visit to the dealership. In other words,
whenever the owner brings the car in and pays $100 for the car to be
serviced, all maintenance, repair, and replacement costs are covered by the
maintenance agreement. Assume that this servicing includes, but is not
limited to, the following activities by the dealership:
(1) Inspect tires and rotate, balance, and replace as necessary;
(2) Check engine coolant levels, adding coolant as necessary, and
inspect for leaks in coolant system;
(3) Check battery acid levels and fill as necessary;
(4) Change oil and inspect for leaks in oil lines; and
(5) Check brakes and adjust and replace as necessary.
Common sense (and an honest mechanic) tell us that the various parts
and systems in cars need differing levels of attention over time and tend to
wear out and/or fail at different intervals. For instance, tires will typically
last for about 30,000 miles and require little or no care during that time
period.95 In contrast, one should probably change the engine oil every 3000
miles to prolong the life of the engine and to prevent sudden engine
failure.96
More importantly, failure to maintain a car presents a variety of risks
to others from the various parts and systems in the car. For example, brake
failure presents the risk that the driver will rear-end another vehicle, while
9 Interview with Caleb Frigerio, supra note 80.
96Jiffy Lube recommends that car owners change their oil every 3000 miles. See
Jiffy Lube Signature Service, at http://jiffylube.con/Services/SignServOilChg.asp
(last visited Feb. 11, 2003).
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failure to maintain a battery could result in minor property damage if the
acid were to leak out onto the driveway of another. The point is that failure
to have one's car regularly serviced presents a variety of risks of harm to
others, some of which are highly probable, others of which are highly
improbable. Furthermore, failure to have one's car regularly serviced
presents a risk of a variety of types of harm, some of which are grave,
others of which are relatively minor.
What follows is an analysis of five particular risks that the salesman's
failure to have his car serviced every 3000 miles would present. Each risk
has a different level of probability associated with that risk that increases
over time.97 Each risk is also associated with a different type of harm whose
gravity remains constant over time. Finally, the burden associated with
preventing each risk is the $100 that the salesman would have to pay to
have his car serviced and repaired as necessary. Accordingly, each of the
risks can be analyzed using the B<PL formula to ascertain whether the
probability of harm multiplied by the gravity of the harm risked outweighs
the burden of spending the $100 to have the car serviced and repaired. Each
of the risks can then be plotted on a line graph to ascertain when the risk of
each type of harm outweighs the burden and thus when the salesman will
have breached a duty of care with respect to that particular risk.
The five risks of harm to be analyzed and plotted on a graph are:
(1) Tire failure caused by excess wear, which causes death or serious
bodily injury to another;
(2) Car overheating on highway due to insufficient levels of coolant,
which causes a passerby who stops to help to be scalded when
removing the radiator cap;
(3) Battery acid leakage due to failure to maintain battery, causing part
of another's driveway to dissolve;
(4) Engine seizing up due to a lack of oil in the engine, causing the
salesman's car to be rear-ended while on the highway; and
(5) Brake failure due to excess wear on the brake shoes, causing the
salesman to rear-end another car on the highway.98
For purposes of this illustration, assume that the salesman never takes his
car into the dealership to be serviced. Assume also that the above five risks
" This is a fairly uncontroversial assumption that simplifies the analysis for
illustrative purposes.
98 Once again, the types of harm identified are simplified to facilitate the
conceptualization of the role B<PL plays in proximate cause analysis.
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could have been individually and collectively eliminated by simply taking
the car in to be regularly serviced. Accordingly, the salesman never incurs
the $100 cost per visit, which is the burden (B) of eliminating the various
risks of harm posed by not servicing his car.
i. tire failure risk
The first type of harm risked by the salesman's failure to have his car
serviced is that during one of his trips to Waco, one of his tires will fail due
to excess wear that would have been detected and remedied had the
salesman taken his car in to get serviced immediately prior to that trip.
Therefore, the burden (B) of eliminating this risk is $1 00--the amount the
salesman would have had to pay to have his tires inspected and replaced
when necessary. As discussed above, the probability (P) of such tire failure
increases with each trip taken because the amount of wear on the tires
increases with the number of miles driven. The gravity of harm risked (L)
remains constant because the type of harm caused by tire blowout on a
highway remains the same regardless of whether that blowout occurs
during the first trip or the twentieth. For purposes of this illustration,
assume that the type of harm risked by tire failure is that another driver on
the highway will die when a tire blowout on the salesman's car causes it to
collide with the car of another. Assume also that a reasonable jury would
conclude that the value of that death is $500,000. The following chart
illustrates the relative risks associated with each trip.99
TABLE 2:
Risks Posed by Failure to Have Car Serviced-TIRE BLOWOUT
Trip # Miles Burden of Probability Gravity Total
Already Taking Car of Tire of Poten- Magnitude
Driven in To Be Failure (in tial Harm of Risk 101
on Tires Serviced percent)
100
1 0 $100 .0006 $500,000 $3
2 3,000 $100 .0016 $500,000 $8
9' See Table 2.
100 These probability numbers are strictly estimates on my part based on my
discussion with a student named Caleb Frigerio who used to be a mechanic.
Interview with Caleb Frigerio, supra note 80. They are illustrative only and do not
purport to be scientifically calculated.
101 This Total Magnitude of Risk number represents the product of The
Probability of Tire Failure (P) multiplied by the Gravity of Potential Harm (L).
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3 6,000 $100 .0028 $500,000 $14
4 9,000 $100 .0042 $500,000 $21
5 12,000 $100 .0058 $500,000 $29
6 15,000 $100 .0076 $500,000 $38
7 18,000 $100 .0096 $500,000 $48
8 21,000 $100 .0118 $500,000 $59
9 24,000 $100 .0142 $500,000 $71
10 27,000 $100 .0170 $500,000 $85
11 30,000 $100 .0200 $500,000 $100
12 33,000 $100 .0230 $500,000 $115
13 36,000 $100 .0262 $500,000 $131
14 39,000 $100 .0296 $500,000 $148
15 42,000 $100 .0332 $500,000 $166
16 45,000 $100 .0370 $500,000 $185
17 48,000 $100 .0410 $500,000 $205
18 51,000 $100 .0452 $500,000 $226
19 54,000 $100 .0496 $500,000 $248
20 57,000 $100 .0542 $500,000 $271
The data from this table can then be plotted on the same type of line
graph depicted earlier,0 2 where the X-axis represents miles traveled and
trips taken and the Y-axis represents the total magnitude of risk.
0 3
112 See Graph 1.
103 See Graph 7.
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As shown in the graph, as the number of miles driven without the
salesman having his car serviced increases, the magnitude of risk of tire
failure also increases. At some point in time, the magnitude of risk exceeds
the amount of burden that would be placed upon the salesman of having the
car serviced."°4
104 See Graph 8.
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GRAPH8:
Risks Posed By Failure to Service Vehicle
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As before, when the curve is below the B=PL line"°5 the salesman is not
breaching a duty of care with respect to the risk of the type of harm created
by failing to have his tires inspected. However, when the curve is above the
B=PL line the salesman is breaching a duty of care with respect to the tires.
With respect to the tires, immediately before Trip 11 B=PL.
ii. overheating risk
A second type of harm the salesman risks by failing to have his car
serviced is the risk that the engine coolant level will drop low enough that
his engine will overheat while he is driving on the desert highway to Waco.
Assume that when his car overheats, he is forced to pull to side of the road,
and that a passerby who stops to help suffers burns when he is scalded after
removing the radiator cap. Finally, assume that the low coolant level could
105 This B=PL line is drawn at the specific point at which the Burden of Taking
the Car in To Be Serviced equals the Total Magnitude of Risk (i.e., Gravity of
Potential Harm multiplied by the Probability of Tire Failure).
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have been detected and remedied before the overheating occurred if the
salesman had taken his car in for servicing prior to the trip.
The burden (B) of eliminating this harm is $ 100--the cost of having
the car serviced. The probability of harm (P) increases over time as the
fluid level drops. However, the gravity of harm remains constant over time
because when the overheating happens will not affect the harm it could
cause. Assume that a reasonable jury would conclude that the value of the
bums is $10,000. The following table illustrates the relative risks from
overheating associated with each trip.1"6
TABLE 3:
Risks Posed by Failure to Have Car Serviced-COOLANT LEAK
Trip# Miles Burden of Probability Gravity Total
Already Taking of Car Over- of Poten- Magnitude
Driven Car in to heating and tial Harm of Risk
of Tires be Ser- Causing
viced Bums (in
percent)'
07
0 $100 .0955 $10,000 $9.55
2 3,000 $100 .1095 $10,000 $10.95
3 6,000 $100 .1240 $10,000 $12.40
4 9,000 $100 .1390 $10,000 $13.90
5 12,000 $100 .1555 $10,000 $15.55
6 15,000 $100 .1725 $10,000 $17.25
7 18,000 $100 .1900 $10,000 $19.00
8 21,000 $100 .2100 $10,000 $21.00
9 24,000 $100 .2400 $10,000 $24.00
10 27,000 $100 .2900 $10,000 $29.00
11 30,000 $100 .3600 $10,000 $36.00
12 33,000 $100 .4500 $10,000 $45.00
13 36,000 $100 .5750 $10,000 $57.50
14 39,000 $100 .7500 $10,000 $75.00
15 42,000 $100 1.0000 $10,000 $100.00
106 See Table 3.
107 These probability numbers are strictly estimates on my part based upon my
discussion with a student named Caleb Frigerio who used to be a mechanic.
Interview with Caleb Frigerio, supra note 80. They are illustrative only and do not
purport to be scientifically calculated.
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16 45,000 $100 1.3000 $10,000 $130.00
17 48,000 $100 1.7000 $10,000 $170.00
18 51,000 $100 2.2000 $10,000 $220.00
19 54,000 $100 2.8000 $10,000 $280.00
20 57,000 $100 3.5000 $10,000 $350.00
The data from this table can then be overlaid on the prior line graph010
so it depicts both the tire and the coolant risk curves.0 9
GRAPH9:
Risks Posed by Failure to Service Vehicle
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As shown in the graph, as the number of miles driven without the
salesman having his car serviced increases, the magnitude of risk of
overheating and of a passerby getting burned also increases. At some point
in time, the magnitude of risk exceeds the amount of burden to the
salesman in having his car serviced. With respect to the coolant, this occurs
immediately prior to Trip 15.
108 See Graph 8.
o9 See Graph 9.
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iii. battery acid risk
A third type of harm the salesman risks by failing to have his car
serviced is the risk that the battery will leak and cause property damage to
another when the battery acid dissolves the concrete on the other's
property. Assume that the battery problem could have been detected and
remedied before the leakage occurred if the salesman had taken his car in
for servicing prior to the trip.
The burden (B) of eliminating this harm is $ 100--the cost of having
the car serviced. The probability of harm (P) increases over time as the
battery ages,"0 while the gravity of harm remains constant over time
because when the leakage happens will not affect the harm it could cause.
Assume that a reasonable jury would conclude that the value of the
property damage is $1,000. The following chart illustrates the relative risks
associated with each trip."'
TABLE 4:
Risks Posed by Failure to Have Car Serviced-BATTERY ACID LEAK
Trip # Miles Burden Probability Gravity of Total
Already of Taking of Battery Potential Magnitude
Driven Car in to Leakage (in Harm of Risk
on Tires be Ser- percent)" 12
viced
1 0 $100 .1 $1,000 $1.00
2 3,000 $100 .2 $1,000 $2.00
3 6,000 $100 .3 $1,000 $3.00
4 9,000 $100 .4 $1,000 $4.00
5 12,000 $100 .5 $1,000 $5.00
6 15,000 $100 .6 $1,000 $6.00
7 18,000 $100 .7 $1,000 $7.00
8 21,000 $100 .8 $1,000 $8.00
9 24,000 $100 .9 $1,000 $9.00
10 27,000 $100 .10 $1,000 $10.00
110 Once again, for purposes of this illustration, I have assumed this to be true.
. See Table 4.
12 These probability numbers are strictly estimates on my part based upon my
discussion with a student named Caleb Frigerio who used to be a mechanic.
Interview with Caleb Frigerio, supra note 80. They are illustrative only and do not
purport to be scientifically calculated.
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11 30,000 $100 .11 $1,000 $11.00
12 33,000 $100 .12 $1,000 $12.00
13 36,000 $100 .13 $1,000 $13.00
14 39,000 $100 .14 $1,000 $14.00
15 42,000 $100 .15 $1,000 $15.00
16 45,000 $100 .16 $1,000 $16.00
17 48,000 $100 .17 $1,000 $17.00
18 51,000 $100 .18 $1,000 $18.00
19 54,000 $100 .19 $1,000 $19.00
20 57,000 $100 .20 $1,000 $20.00
The data from this table can then be overlaid on the prior line graph to
depict the tire, coolant, and battery risk curves.
113
GRAPH 10:
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As shown in the graph, as the number of miles driven without the
salesman having his car serviced increases, the magnitude of risk of the
113 See Graph 10.
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battery acid leaking and causing property damage also increases. Unlike the
tire and coolant risk curves, the battery curve never crosses the B=PL line.
This is because the relatively minor amount of harm risked when multiplied
by the relatively small likelihood of this leak occurring never exceeds the
burden of having the battery checked." 4
iv. oil risk
A fourth type of harm the salesman risks by failing to have his car
serviced is the risk that oil will leak, causing the salesman's engine to seize
up on the highway which will consequently cause his car to be rear-ended
by another car on the highway. Assume that the oil leak problem could have
been detected and remedied before the leakage occurred if the salesman had
taken his car in for servicing prior to the trip.
The burden (B) of eliminating this harm is $ 100--the cost of having
the car serviced. The probability of harm (P) increases over time as the oil
and filter ages, while the gravity of harm remains constant over time
because when the leakage happens will not affect the harm it could cause.
Assume that a reasonable jury would conclude that the value of the injuries
caused to the driver of the car that rear-ends the salesman's car is $100,000.
The following chart illustrates the relative risks associated with each trip.' '
TABLE 5:
Risks Posed by Failure to Have Car Serviced--OIL LEAK
Trip # Miles Burden of Probability Gravity Total
Already Taking of Oil Leak- of Poten- Magnitude
Driven Car in to age (in per- tial Harm of Risk
on Tires be cent)" 6
Serviced
1 0 $100 .0060 $100,000 $6.00
2 3,000 $100 .0080 $100,000 $8.00
3 6,000 $100 .0110 $100,000 $11.00
4 9,000 $100 .0150 $100,000 $15.00
114 More precisely, the magnitude of risk does not exceed the B=PL line during
any of the first twenty trips. If the battery risk curve were extrapolated out further,
it would eventually intersect the B=PL line at the beginning of the 100th trip.
I" See Table 5.
116 These probability numbers are strictly estimates on my part based upon my
discussion with a student named Caleb Frigerio who used to be a mechanic.
Interview with Caleb Frigerio, supra note 80. They are illustrative only and do not
purport to be scientifically calculated.
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5 12,000 $100 .0220 $100,000 $22.00
6 15,000 $100 .0360 $100,000 $36.00
7 18,000 $100 .0600 $100,000 $60.00
8 21,000 $100 .0990 $100,000 $99.00
9 24,000 $100 .1900 $100,000 $190.00
10 27,000 $100 .3000 $100,000 $300.00
11 30,000 $100 .4200 $100,000 $420.00
12 33,000 $100 .5500 $100,000 $550.00
13 36,000 $100 .6900 $100,000 $690.00
14 39,000 $100 .8400 $100,000 $840.00
15 42,000 $100 1.0000 $100,000 $1,000.00
16 45,000 $100 1.1700 $100,000 $1,170.00
17 48,000 $100 1.3500 $100,000 $1,350.00
18 51,000 $100 1.5400 $100,000 $1,540.00
19 54,000 $100 1.7400 $100,000 $1,740.00
20 57,000 $100 1.9500 $100,000 $1,950.00
The data from this table can then be overlaid on the prior line graph so
it depicts the tire, coolant, battery, and oil risk curves.'
17
"' See Graph 11.
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As shown in the graph, as the number of miles driven without the
salesman having his car serviced increases, the magnitude of risk of the oil
leaking and causing a rear-end accident also increases. At some point in
time, the magnitude of risk exceeds the amount of burden that would be
placed upon the salesman in having his car serviced. With respect to the oil,
this occurs immediately prior to Trip 8.
v. brake failure risk
A fifth type of harm the salesman risks by failing to have his car
serviced is the risk that the brakes will wear out or fail, causing the
salesman to rear-end another car while on the highway. Assume that the
brake problem could have been discovered and remedied before the failure
occurred if the salesman had taken his car in for servicing prior to the trip.
The burden (B) of eliminating this harm is $1 00-the cost of having
the car serviced. The probability of harm (P) increases over time as the
braking system ages, while the gravity of harm remains constant over time
because when the leakage happens will not affect the harm it could cause.
Assume that a reasonable jury would conclude that the value of the injuries
GRAPH 11:
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caused to the driver of the car that is rear-ended by the salesman's car is
$250,000. The following chart illustrates the relative risks associated with
each trip.1 8
TABLE 6:
Risks Posed by Failure to Have Car Serviced-BRAKE FAILURE
Trip # Miles Burden - Probability Gravity of Total
Already Taking of Brake Potential Magnitude
Driven Car in to Failure (in Harm of Risk
on Tires be Ser- percent) 119
viced
1 0 $100 .00320 $250,000 $8.00
2 3,000 $100 .00328 $250,000 $8.20
3 6,000 $100 .00344 $250,000 $8.60
4 9,000 $100 .00368 $250,000 $9.20
5 12,000 $100 .00400 $250,000 $10.00
6 15,000 $100 .00440 $250,000 $11.00
7 18,000 $100 .00500 $250,000 $12.50
8 21,000 $100 .00580 $250,000 $14.50
9 24,000 $100 .00670 $250,000 $16.75
10 27,000 $100 .00790 $250,000 $19.75
11 30,000 $100 .00930 $250,000 $23.25
12 33,000 $100 .01100 $250,000 $27.50
13 36,000 $100 .01320 $250,000 $33.00
14 39,000 $100 .01650 $250,000 $41.25
15 42,000 $100 .02020 $250,000 $50.50
16 45,000 $100 .02430 $250,000 $60.75
17 48,000 $100 .02880 $250,000 $72.00
18 51,000 $100 .03390 $250,000 $84.75
19 54,000 $100 .03900 $250,000 $97.50
20 57,000 $100 .04520 $250,000 $113.00
..8 See Table 6.
"9 These probability numbers are strictly estimates on my part based upon my
discussion with a student named Caleb Frigerio who used to be a mechanic.
Interview with Caleb Frigerio, supra note 80. They are illustrative only and do not
purport to be scientifically calculated.
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The data from this table can then be overlaid on the prior line graph so
it depicts the tire, coolant, battery, oil, and brakes risk curves.'
As shown in the graph, as the number of miles driven without the
salesman having his car serviced increases, the magnitude of risk of the
brakes failing and causing a rear-end accident also increases. At some point
in time, the magnitude of risk exceeds the amount of burden that would be
placed upon the salesman. With respect to the brakes, this occurs immedi-
ately prior to Trip 20.
The line graph depicting each of the types of risks, thus, can be used to
ascertain at which point in time the risk of causing that type of harm is
sufficiently high so as to render the salesman's failure to have his car
serviced a breach of a duty of care with respect to each type of harm. It is
at this point that the difference between determining whether there has been
a breach of a duty and determining whether that particular breach of a duty
was a proximate cause of the injury can be starkly illustrated. Recall that
earlier I argued that Justice Andrews won the battle, but Justice Cardozo
121 See Graph 12.
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won the war. 2' Justice Andrews' view that a breach of a duty of care to one
person is a breach of a duty to all has ultimately carried the day.'22
Accordingly, in order to determine whether there has been a breach of a
duty of due care, one must cumulate all of the risks posed by an actor's
conduct in order to ascertain whether, once cumulated, the risks outweigh
the utility of the conduct at issue. In other words, an actor has breached a
duty of due care when the sum of all risks posed by the conduct at issue
exceeds the utility of that conduct. In B<PL parlance, one breaches a duty
of care when the probability of each type of harm multiplied by the gravity
of each type of harm risked added together exceeds the burden placed upon
the actor of not engaging in the conduct at issue.
Once again, the hypothetical traveling salesman will illustrate this
process. A legal snapshot taken just before Trip 5 shows that none of the
individual risks exceeds the point at which B=PL. Accordingly, with
respect to each of the particular risks, the salesman is not breaching a duty
of care. This can be graphically illustrated in a bar graph.'23
GRAPH 13:
Risk of Harms Before Trip #5
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121 See discussion supra at Part I.B. L.a.
122 See supra note 68.
123 See Graph 13.
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This graph depicts how Justice Cardozo envisioned the breach of duty
analysis.124 Because none of the types of harm risked is sufficiently high to
warrant a determination that the salesman has breached a duty of care with
respect to that particular risk, Justice Cardozo would argue that the
salesman has not breached a duty of care in the first instance. None of the
risks falls within Cardozo's "orbit of danger," and hence would not be risks
reasonably to be perceived by the salesman's conduct of driving." 5 As
stated earlier, Justice Cardozo lost on this point.
26
Accordingly, when determining whether there has been a breach, the
individual blocks need to be stacked upon one another to show the
cumulative risk posed by the conduct at issue. 27
GRAPH 14:
Cumulative Risk of Harms Before Trip #5
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124 Justice Cardozo focused on the forseeability of the plaintiff rather than on
the foreseeability of the harm caused to the plaintiff, but that is a distinction
without much functional difference. This presupposes that the different types of
harm risked are to different potential plaintiffs. See supra note 64.
125 See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
126 See supra note 68.
127 See Graph 14.
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This graph depicts how Justice Andrews arguably envisioned the
breach of duty analysis. Because the sum of the types of harm risked still
does not exceed the point at which B=PL, the salesman has not breached
a duty of care and is not liable even if his failure to take his car in to be
serviced causes one of the five types of harm. Therefore, measuring
liability for harm caused during Trip 5 yields the same result under either
Justice Cardozo's approach or that of Justice Andrews. Practically
speaking, this means that the salesman would have neither breached a duty
of care nor proximately caused the harm alleged. The same is not true for
Trip 6.
Cumulating the risks posed before Trip 6 means that the salesman has
breached a duty of care by failing to take his car in to be serviced.1
28
GRAPH 15:
Cumulative Risk of Harms Before Trip #6
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128 See Graph 15.
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As depicted in Graph 15, the sum of the harms risked prior to Trip 6 are
greater than the salesman's burden of having his car serviced before that
trip. Therefore, according to Justice Andrews and the prevailing view of
courts, the salesman has breached a duty of care. This finding of breach, of
course, does not equate to a finding of liability even when this breach is
found to be a factual cause of the plaintiff's harm. One must also ascertain
whether such breach was a proximate cause. This is where Cardozo has
won the war.
The proximate cause inquiry, plainly and simply, involves an unstack-
ing of the building blocks that determine the breach question. This
unstacking of the particular risks posed graphically illustrates Justice
Cardozo's approach to ascertaining whether there has been a breach of a
duty. This analysis, rejected as the test for determining breach of duty,
accurately describes howI believe the Restatement Third correctly analyzes
proximate cause. When applied to Trip 6, this approach demonstrates that
while the salesman may have breached a duty of care,'29 he has not
proximately caused any of the five types of harm analyzed because none of
the risk blocks reaches the B=PL line.
130
129 See id.
130 See Graph 16.
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GRAPH 16:
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This graph, thus, depicts the approach to the breach of duty determina-
tion advocated by Justice Cardozo, ultimately adopted as the approach to
proximate cause as described by the Restatement Third. Therefore, while
Justice Cardozo lost the battle over the role and nomenclature of this
determination, he won the war over whether this scope of risk, or proximate
cause, inquiry would ultimately determine liability."'
Determining the scope of liability for the particular types of harm
risked is easily ascertained by using the graphs. A series of bar graphs can
illustrate at which point in time each of the particular types of risks, if
suffered, would give rise to liability. As shown in the previous graph, none
of the risk blocks for the particular types of harm evaluated exceeds the
B=PL line at Trip 6.132 Consequently, the salesman would not be a
proximate cause if any of those types of harm occurred. At Trip 9, however,
the risk block for an oil leak first exceeds the B=PL line.
133
' The multi-factored and highly subjective approach advocated by Justice
Andrews in Palsgrafhas failed to carry the day. See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R.,
162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
132 See Graph 16.
3 See Graph 17.
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GRAPH 17:
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Accordingly, if this particular type of harm occurred during Trip 9 (or
during any subsequent trip), the salesman would be a proximate cause of
the harm. However, since no risk blocks for other types of harm exceed the
B=PL line, the salesman would not be a proximate cause of those types of
harm if they occurred during Trip 9 (or during any previous trip).
At Trip 12, the risk block for a tire blowout first exceeds the B=PL
line, which means that the salesman would be a proximate cause of this
type of harm if it occurred during Trip 12 (or during any subsequent trip).1
34
134 See Graph 18.
[VOL. 91
(PROPOSED) RESTATEMENT THIRD OF TORTS
GRAPH 18:
Risk of Harms Before Trip #12
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At Trip 16, the risk block for a coolant leak first exceeds the B=PL line,
which means that the salesman would be a proximate cause of this type of
harm should it occur during Trip 16 (or any subsequent trip).'
"' See Graph 19.
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At Trip 20, the risk block for brake failure first exceeds the B=PL line,
which means that the salesman would be a proximate cause of this type of
harm should it occur during Trip 20 (or any subsequent trip).'36
136 See Graph 20.
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e. Determining the Level of Generality
The relative simplicity with which the breach of duty and proximate
cause inquiries have been illustrated in conjunction with the traveling
salesman hypothetical dissipates when the assumptions that accompany this
academic exercise are removed. To clarify, the simplicity of the concepts
does not dissipate, but instead the simplicity of application is lost in real
life applications. Complexity arises chiefly because one must determine the
level of generality at which one classifies the type of harm to be
analyzed.137 What is meant by "level of generality" is the number of
individual risk blocks that, when stacked, make up the unitary risk block
that forms the basis for the breach of duty inquiry. The more individual risk
blocks into which the unitary risk block can be divided and then unstacked
for the proximate cause inquiry,' 8 the less chance any individual risk block
(type of harm risked) actually at issue will exceed the burden to the actor
'
37 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 29
cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002).
138 See infra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
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being analyzed. Unfortunately, there is no definitive way to determine the
appropriate level of generality.139
The Restatement Third wrestles with this question in the Reporters'
Comments and in the Illustrations. For example, Illustration 2 to Section 29
uses the following hypothetical:
Richard, a hunter, finishes his day in the field and stops at a friend's
house while walking home. Greeted by Kim, his friend's nine-year-old
daughter, Richard hands his loaded shotgun to Kim and enters the house.
Kim drops the shotgun, which lands on her toe, breaking it. Although
Richard was negligent for leaving Kim with his shotgun, the risk that
made Richard negligent was that Kim might shoot someone with the gun,
not that she would drop it and hurt herself (the gun was neither especially
heavy nor unwieldy). Richard is not liable to Kim for her broken toe, even
though Richard's tortious conduct was a factual cause of Kim's harm. 4°
In stating that Richard is "negligent" for leaving Kim with his shotgun,
the Reporters are merely saying that Richard breached a duty of care. This,
of course, means that when one cumulates all of the risks associated with
giving a child a shotgun, those risks outweigh the burden of Richard
carrying the shotgun into the house and safely putting it away himself.
Stated differently, this analysis assumes that the unitary risk block (used to
ascertain breach) formed by stacking the individual risk blocks exceeds the
B=PL line. It also assumes that a broken foot is necessarily a different type
of harm than a gunshot wound and, thus, is a separate risk block. Once
again, this can be illustrated graphically. 4 '
' Accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM
§ 29 cmt. i (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002) ("No specific rule can be
provided about the appropriate level of generality or specificity to employ in
characterizing the harm for purposes of this section.").
140 See id., § 29 cint. f, illus. 2.
141 See Graph 21.
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Richard is not a proximate cause of the injury to Kim, however,
because the probability of Kim dropping the gun onto her foot, when
multiplied by the gravity of harm a broken foot represents, is less than the
burden to Richard of taking care of the gun himself. Accordingly, when the
risk block for a broken foot is unstacked for the proximate cause inquiry,
it does not rise to the level of the B=PL line.
142
142 See Graph 22.
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GRAPH 22:
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But what if instead one characterizes the type of harm risked as bodily
injury to a child handed a loaded gun? This broad statement of the level of
generality at which to analyze the facts would lead to a different result. At
that broad level of generality, there is only one risk block, which by itself
would exceed the B=PL line, thus establishing proximate cause. 43
Returning to the traveling salesman hypothetical will allow for a
graphic illustration of the effects of assuming differing levels of generality.
In the hypothetical, I have utilized a fairly narrow level of generality in
dividing the types of harm risked into five distinct categories. Once again,
these five categories of types of harm are:
(1) Tire failure caused by excess wear, which causes death or serious
bodily injury;
(2) Car overheating on highway due to insufficient levels of coolant,
which causes a passerby who stops to help to be scalded when
removing the radiator cap;
143 See Graph 21.
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(3) Battery acid leakage due to failure to maintain battery, causing part
of another's driveway to dissolve;
(4) Engine seizing up due to a lack of oil in the engine, causing the
salesman's car to be rear-ended while on the highway; and
(5) Brake failure due to excess wear on the brake shoes, causing the
salesman to rear-end another car on the highway.
At the beginning of Trip 8, these narrowly-defined types of risks can
be plotted on a bar graph. 14
GRAPH 23:
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44 See Graph 23.
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As the graph shows, none of the narrowly defined risk blocks exceeds
the B=PL line, so the traveling salesman would not be a proximate cause
of any of the particular types of harm should any one of them occur during
Trip 8. Suppose, however, that one divides the particular types of harm into
fewer than five categories. One could persuasively argue that the risk of a
rear-end collision generally should be one type of harm rather than the two
types of harm. In other words, the risk that the brakes will fail and cause the
salesman to rear-end another car should be in the same category as the risk
that the oil will leak and ultimately cause the salesman to be rear-ended.
Consequently, the risk blocks for the brakes and oil would be stacked upon
one another, becoming one block, when utilizing this level of generality. 45
GRAPH 24:
Risk of Harms Before Trip 8
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145 See Graph 24.
[VOL. 91
(PROPOSED) RESTATEMENT THIRD OF TORTS
As the graph depicts, the risk block formed by stacking the individual
brake and oil blocks now exceeds the B=PL line. Therefore, viewing the
types of harm risked at a slightly broader level of generality changes the
outcome of the proximate cause inquiry and, ultimately, the case. At this
level of generality, the salesman would properly be deemed to be the
proximate cause of a rear-end collision caused by either brake failure or oil
leakage. At this level of generality, the salesman would not be a proximate
cause of a rear-end collision that occurred during Trip 7.146
GRAPH 25:
Risk of Harms Before Trip 7
(Oil Leak & Brake Failure Combined)
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Type of Risk
As this graph depicts, even when the brakes and oil risk blocks are
stacked, they do not reach the level of the B=PL line. If, however, one
adopts an even broader view of the appropriate level of generality, then the
salesman's potential liability proportionately expands. For example, if the
type of harm risked by the salesman's failure to service his car is character-
ized as the risk that a car accident will happen, then the salesman will be
properly deemed to be the proximate cause of a car accident resulting from
146 See Graph 25.
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brake failure, oil leakage, or a tire blowout during Trip 7. This is true
because at that level of generality each of the individual risk blocks
representing these types of harm would be stacked upon one another
becoming one risk block. 
147
GRAPH 26:
Risk of Harms Before Trip 7
(Tire Blowout, Oil Leak, & Brake Failure Combined)
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Type of Risk
As this graph depicts, the risk block now formed exceeds the B=PL
line. Therefore, viewing the types of harm risked at this level of generality
changes the outcome of the case because the salesman would now be
properly deemed the proximate cause of the car accident. Even at this
broader level of generality, the salesman would not be a proximate cause
of a car accident caused by brake failure, oil leakage, or a tire blowout that
occurred during Trip 6.148
147 See Graph 26.
141 See Graph 27.
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GRAPH 27:
Risk of Harms Before Trip 6
(Tire Blowout, Oil Leak, & Brake Failure Combined)
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Type of Risk
As this graph depicts, even when the brakes, oil, and tire blocks are
stacked, they do not reach the level of the B=PL line. If, however, one
adopts an extremely broad view of the appropriate level of generality, then
the salesman's potential liability expands even further. As a final example,
if the type of harm risked by the salesman's failure to service his car is
characterized as the risk of personal injury to another, then the salesman
will be properly deemed the proximate cause of injuries factually caused
by brake failure, oil leakage, a tire blowout, or coolant leakage during Trip
6. This is true because at this level of generality each of the individual risk
blocks representing these types of harm would be stacked upon one another
becoming one block.149
.49 See Graph 28.
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GRAPH 28:
Risk of Harms Before Trip 6
(Coolant Leak, Tire Blowout, Oil Leak, & Brake Failure
Combined)
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Type of Risk
As this graph depicts, the risk block now formed exceeds the B=PL
line. Therefore, viewing the types of harm risked at this level of generality
changes the outcome of the case because the salesman would now be
properly deemed the proximate cause of the personal injury caused by any
one of these risks.
While the above illustrates the effect of utilizing broad versus narrow
levels of generality in determining the types of harm risked (i.e., the
number and size of the individual risk blocks), it does not dictate which
level of generality is the correct one. This is because there is no one right
answer. As recognized by Dobbs, "[i]t is not usually possible to say that
only one description of the risk is the right one, so the question calls for
judgment."15
Accordingly, unless reasonable minds cannot differ, the appropriate
level of generality is a jury question.51 This, of course, means that the
150 See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 189, at 469 (2000).
... See 1 id. ("Although that judgment is ordinarily left to the jury, sometimes
judges feel that the matter is too clear for debate."). The Restatement Third
Reporters agree:
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persuasiveness of the lawyers in convincing the jurors to view the risks
narrowly or broadly will likely determine the outcome of the case. Counsel
for plaintiffs will argue for a broad view of the risks, while counsel for
defendants will argue for a narrow view of the risks.152
II. INTERVENING ACTS AND SUPERSEDING CAUSES
As discussed earlier, the events of September 11 th resulted in the loss
of billions of dollars and thousands of lives. 53 Certainly the hijackers are
to blame, but almost as certainly, their estates are not capable of responding
in damages to any material degree.154 Recently, plaintiffs filed lawsuits
against United and American Airlines seeking to recover large sums of
money for deaths and injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of the
airlines in allowing the hijackers to board the planes while carrying box
cutters with two-inch blades.'55 While the airlines will not likely dispute
that they had a duty to exercise reasonable care in screening passengers and
their carry-on items,'56 they will undoubtedly argue that they did not breach
[M]any cases will pose straightforward or manageable determinations of
whether the harm that occurred was one of those risked by the tortious
conduct. Yet in others, there will be contending plausible characterizations
that lead to different outcomes and require the drawing of an evaluative and
somewhat arbitrary line. Those cases are left to the community judgment
and common sense provided by the jury.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 29 cmt. i
(Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002).
152 Accord I DOBBS, supra note 150, § 189, at 468 ("As a matter of argumenta-
tion, it always serves the defendant to describe the risk as precisely as possible and
the plaintiff to describe it as abstractly as possible."). But see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 29, Reporters' Note cmt. i
(Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002) ("Professor Morris explained the point that
efforts by advocates to push the specificity or generality of the description envelope
too far are generally counter-productive, as the artificiality of such efforts is often
apparent.").
153 For example, insurance companies are now embroiled in a dispute with the
leaseholder for the World Trade Center Towers and will ultimately have to pay
between 3.55 and 7.1 billion dollars to the insured. See Steven Brill, Building
Castles in the Clouds, NEWSWEEK, July 29, 2002, at 44.
154 The likelihood of recovering from a foreign government or a terrorist
organization seems equally remote. But see Horrock, supra note 14.
s See supra note 14.
156 Prior to September 1 th, airlines were responsible for providing their own
pre-boarding security. In the wake of September 1 th, airport security has been
federalized. See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115
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their duty of reasonable care.'57 As discussed earlier, this breach determina-
tion will be made by cumulating all of the risks presented by the airline's
conduct and plugging them in to the B<PL formula. 15 8 This analysis is
performed in Part 1I. For now, I will assume for the sake of argument
that a jury could and would find that the airlines breached a duty of due
care.160
Assuming there was such a breach, then the question of whether the
airlines were a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by those in the
World Trade Center Towers is squarely presented. In other words, someone
must then decide whether or not the intentional, criminal acts of the
hijackers relieve the airlines of the liability to pay for the extraordinary
damages factually caused by their presumed breach of a duty.161 As is often
the case in the law, where one begins analysis frequently dictates where one
ultimately ends. Whether a court adopts the proposed Restatement Third
approach to this inquiry as outlined in Section 33 or chooses instead to
apply the majority rule now in place could very well determine the extent,
if any, of the airlines' liability.
A. Background and Definitions
At the outset, it is important to define the relevant terms that have
traditionally governed this type of proximate cause analysis. When, after
an actor breaches a duty of care, a new cause or force combines with the
original actor's negligence to factually cause an injury, that new cause or
Stat. 597 (2001).
'5' Among other arguments, United Airlines will likely point out that a federal
directive issued in 1972 and in effect on September 11 th permitted the carrying of
blades up to four-inches long on airplanes. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, America
Attacked Travel, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001, at A20.
158 See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
159 See infra notes 258-302 and accompanying text.
6 When I speak of a breach of a duty, I am referring to the jury finding that the
probability of some type of harm multiplied by the gravity of that harm was greater
than the burden of not allowing two-inch blades onto the plane. See supra notes
121-27 and accompanying text. I am not saying that the probability of an airplane
hitting and knocking down a building multiplied by the gravity of that harm is
greater than the burden of not allowing such blades onto the plane-that question
is one of proximate cause, or scope of risk as characterized by the Restatement
Third. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
161 There is no doubt that allowing the hijackers on the planes with box cutters
was the factual cause of the damages suffered by those in the buildings.
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force is called an "intervening act."' 62 A "superseding cause" is an
intervening act that operates to relieve the original actor of liability for the
ultimate harm even though the original actor was a factual cause of that
harm. 63 In other words, intervening acts are retrospectively labeled
superseding causes when there is a compelling reason for relieving the
original breaching party of liability.'6 Determining precisely which types
of intervening acts are properly treated as superseding causes (or whether
an entirely different approach to this inquiry should be taken) has occupied,
and continues to occupy, courts and commentators.161 Such a determination
will influence, if not dictate, the answer to the question of whether the
September 1 1th hijackers are merely intervening actors or are, instead,
properly denominated superseding causes, thus relieving the airlines of any
liability for the resultant harm. 1
66
B. The Evolution of Intervening Act/Superseding Cause Analysis
Over the years, courts have utilized essentially three approaches to
ascertain whether intervening acts are properly deemed superseding
causes. 67 The first approach, which I will call the "historical" approach,
starts from the premise that foreseeable intervening acts are not supersed-
162 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 441(1)
(1965) ("An intervening force is one which actively operates in producing harm to
another after the actor's negligent act or omission has been committed."); 1 DOBBS,
supra note 150, § 186, at 461 ("An intervening cause is a new cause that comes
into play after the defendant's negligent conduct.").
163 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 440 (1965)
("A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its
intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his
antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about."); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 33 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No.
2, Mar. 25, 2002) ("A 'superseding cause' is an intervening force or act that is
sufficient to prevent liability for an actor whose tortious conduct was a factual
cause of harm.").
' See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 33
cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002) (explaining that the terms intervening
and superseding are "only conclusory labels").
165 See infra notes 167-257 and accompanying text.
166 This question is addressed in Part III of this Article. See infra notes 258-302
and accompanying text.
167 As discussed infra, this is a bit of an over-generalization because the first
approach is merely a specific application of the second approach.
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ing causes, but unforeseeable intervening acts are superseding causes. It
then declares that intervening culpable acts (intentional or criminal) are
unforeseeable as a matter of law and are thus necessarily deemed
superseding causes.'68 The second approach, which I will call the "tradi-
tional" approach, simply jettisons the historical approach's automatic
determination that intervening criminal or intentional acts are ipso facto
unforeseeable and thus superseding causes, leaving a straightforward
question of the foreseeability of the intervening act as the dispositive
question.'69 The third approach, which I will call the "Restatement Third"
approach, disclaims any interest in determining whether or not the
intervening act is foreseeable, and instead simply applies the proximate
cause test set forth in Section 29.170 This means that the focus is on whether
the ultimate harm caused by the intervening act (not the act itself) was
within the scope of risk created by the original actor's negligence. 7' As
discussed below, the practical import of this approach is to shift the
foreseeability spotlight away from the intervening act and toward the
ultimate harm caused.
172
1. The Historical Approach
The intervening act/superseding cause analysis "developed at a time
when the prevailing jurisprudence was that law was scientifically based and
correct legal principles could be deduced through logical and objective
inquiry."' Consequently, courts and commentators believed that there was
a single and identifiable cause of every event that "could be determined
through a neutral, scientific inquiry."'174 Out of this thinking grew an
approach to causation that was characterized by intricate and extensive
rules about precisely which intervening acts qualified as superseding
168 See infra notes 173-95 and accompanying text.
169 See infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
170 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 33 cmt.
a (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002) ("This section adopts a rule on scope of
liability that is functionally the same as § 29").
171 See infra notes 243-57 and accompanying text.
172 In other words, the question is no longer whether the intervening act was
foreseeable, but is now whether the ultimate harm that resulted was foreseeable
from the standpoint of the original negligent actor.
... RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 33 cmt.
a (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002).
174 id.
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causes, and which did not.175 One of these rules stated that unforeseeable
intervening acts were deemed to be superseding causes.'76 The rule then
clarified that if the intervening act was a criminal or intentionally tortious
act, it was deemed to be unforeseeable, thus a superseding cause, as a
matter of law.I77 Apparently, the rationale was that if there was a single,
identifiable proximate cause, then the intervening culpable act (rather than
the original breach of a duty) had to be it.'78 The fiction that had to be
indulged to reach this result was that one can never foresee the criminal
conduct of another. '79 The case of Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge &
1" Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 439-52 (1934)). The
Restatement Second contained only modest changes to this approach. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 439-52 (1965).
176 As discussed infra, this statement of the general rule represents what I refer
to as the traditional approach.
177 See generally 1 DOBBS, supra note 150, § 190, at 471 ("In an earlier era,
courts tended to hold that intervening criminal acts were unforeseeable as a matter
of law."); see also Andrews v. Kinsel, 40 S.E. 300, 300 (Ga. 1901) ("It is also a
well-recognized principle that where there has intervened between the defendant's
negligent act and the injury an independent illegal act of a third person, producing
the injury, and without which it would not have happened, the latter is properly
held the proximate cause of the injury, and the defendant is excused."); Laurence
H. Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding Cause, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 121,
124 (1937) ("[T]he [historical] rule was that if after the defendant's wrongful
conduct there intervened the wrongful (culpable) act of a third person, the latter
relieved the defendant from liability, and 'the last human wrongdoer' was solely
responsible for the plaintiff's harm."); Michael D. Green, The Unanticipated
Ripples of Comparative Negligence: Superseding Cause in Products Liability and
Beyond, 53 S.C. L. REv. 1103, 1113 (2002) ("Particularly when the intervening
act was the product of intentionally tortious or criminal behavior, superseding
cause doctrine prevented a negligent individual from bearing the entirety (or any)
of the liability in which considerably more culpable conduct played a role.").
7 8 See, e.g., Crandall v. Consol. Tel., Tel., & Elec. Co., 127 P. 994, 997 (Ariz.
1912) ("The criminal act of a third party can never be the natural sequence in the
link of circumstances leading up to an injury, but, when such act is present, it must
be considered as the efficient proximate cause of the subsequent injury, and the law
will not go beyond it for a proximate cause.").
1' See, e.g., Henderson v. Dade Coal Co., 28 S.E. 251,252 (1897) (holding that
sexual assault by escaped prisoner relieved negligent custodian of prisoner of
liability because such conduct was unforeseeable as a matter of law even though
same prisoner had previously escaped five times and was "prone to a desire for
sexual intercourse"); Shugart v. Egan, 83 Ill. 56, 56 (1876) (In action by plaintiff's
deceased wife against defendant who negligently served decedent intoxicating
liquor followed by decedent being killed by a third party, court finds that
intervening violent assault "is no more to be anticipated than any other criminal act
of a third party."). See also D'Ambra v. Peak Building Corp., 680 A.2d 939, 941
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Railroad Co.,"18 illustrates the operation of this "historical" approach to the
treatment of intervening culpable acts.
In Watson, the defendant railroad company negligently spilled a large
quantity of gasoline into the street.' The plaintiff was injured when a third
party lit a match near the gasoline causing it to ignite.18z The parties
disputed whether the individual who lit the match did so intending merely
to light a cigar, or did so with the intent to set the gasoline. ablaze.'83 The
appellate court found the answer to that question to be dispositive. If the
fire was started accidentally, then it would merely be an intervening act,
and not a superseding cause, thus the defendant would be liable for
plaintiffs injuries." 4 If instead, the third party acted maliciously for the
purpose of starting a fire, then the railroad would not be responsible
because it "could not have foreseen or deemed it probable that one would
maliciously or wantonly do such an act for the evil purpose of producing
the explosion." '185 Therefore, the outcome of the case depended entirely
upon whether the intervening act was criminal or intentional on the one
hand, or unintentional on the other hand.'86
Several illustrations contained in Section 442B of the Restatement
Second perpetuate this rule,8 7 one of which recites and applies the facts of
(R.I. 1996) (explaining that defendant" 'was not bound to anticipate mischievous
or wrongful acts on the part of others, and hence was not bound to guard against
them"' (quoting Mahogany v. Ward, 17 A. 860,862 (R.I. 1889))); 1 DOBBS, supra
note 150, § 190, at 472 ("The earlier cases were prone to declare, contrary to
human experience, that criminal acts could not be anticipated or at least that the
defendant was under no obligation to anticipate them. Some contemporary cases
come close to saying the same thing.").
180 Watson v. Ky. & Ind. Bridge & R.R. Co., 126 S.W. 146 (Ky. 1910).
181 Id. at 147.
'
82 Id. at 147-48.
'
8 3 Id. at 149.
1
84 Id. at 150-51.
I8 5 1d, at 151. The court further explained that:
The mere fact that the concurrent cause or intervening act was unfore-
seen will not relieve the defendant guilty of the primary negligence from
liability, but if the intervening agency is something so unexpected or
extraordinary as that he could not or ought not to have anticipated it, he will
not be liable, and certainly he is not bound to anticipate the criminal acts of
others by which damage is inflicted....
Id.
186 The Watson court remanded the case to the trial court to make this deter-
mination. Id.
187 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 442B cmt. c, illus. 7-10
(1965).
[VOL. 91
(PROPOSED) RESTATEMENT THIRD OF TORTS
Watson. 88 Another of the illustrations involves an actor who negligently
leaves a hole on a public sidewalk. 89 The Reporters declare that if a
traveler negligently bumps another into that hole, then the original actor is
liable, 9 ' but if the traveler deliberately pushes another into the hole, then
the original actor is not liable. 9 '
In the mid-twentieth century, courts began to expand common law
duties to impose the obligation to take precautions against subsequent
negligent or intentional conduct on the part of others.'92 This change
prompted a widespread re-evaluation of the historical approach to
intervening acts; if the law deems actors negligent for failing to guard
against culpable conduct by others, then it cannot be the case that such
conduct by others is unforeseeable as a matter of law. Courts and commen-
tators thereafter explicitly rejected the historical approach.'93 In fact, the
Watson case 94 was expressly overruled and characterized as representing
an "archaic doctrine [that] has been rejected everywhere."'95
2. The Traditional Approach
As courts abandoned the pretense that culpable acts of others were
categorically unforeseeable, the general rule emerged that foreseeable
intervening acts are not superseding causes, even if the acts are criminal or
'88Id. illus. 8.
89 Id. illus. 7.
"I Id. illus. 5.
191 Id. illus. 7.
'92 See generally Green, supra note 177, at 1122 ("When the sole source of the
risk consisted of third-party conduct and tort law expanded the obligation of
merchants, landlords, employers, and other enterprise actors capable of preventing
harm caused by the criminal acts of others, superseding law necessarily con-
formed."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442B cmt. c, illus. 7
(1965).
'9' See, e.g., d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886, 894 (9th Cir.
1997) (recognizing that while it once followed the historical approach, Arizona
now applies traditional approach); Largo Corp. v. Crespin, 727 P.2d 1098, 1103
(Colo. 1986) (rejecting historical approach as "outdated and ill-reasoned" in favor
of traditional rule that "[a]n intentionally tortious or criminal act of a third party
does not break the causal chain if it is reasonably foreseeable"); 6 B.E. WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 993, at 383 (9th ed. 1988) ("The view... that an
intervening criminal act is by its very nature a superseding cause... is rejected by
many courts and writers as an illogical and undesirable formula.").
'94 See supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
195 Britton v. Wooten, 817 S.W.2d 443, 449 (Ky. 1991).
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intentional. "In general, the courts have moved away from rule-of-law
decisions about broad categories of cases like these and have examined the
facts of particular cases to determine whether intervening criminal acts are
foreseeable."'1 96 In cases where the intervening criminal acts were foresee-
able, they were not deemed to be superseding causes and liability was
imposed upon the original actor. 97 Alternately, when the intervening
criminal act was unforeseeable, courts found the intervening act to be a
superseding cause.1 9 Whether the intervening act is foreseeable is a
question of fact for the jury to determine, 99 as is true with proximate cause
196 1 DOBBS, supra note 150, § 190 at 473.
197 See, e.g., Cusenbary v. Mortensen, 987 P.2d 351,358 (Mont. 1999) (finding
that driving drunk was a foreseeable intervening act which did not supersede
original negligence of serving alcohol to visibly intoxicated individual); Washa v.
Oregon Dep't of Corrections, 979 P.2d 273, 283 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that
the intervening acts of rape and murder were foreseeable in light of parolee's
criminal history, preserving causal link with negligent defendant). See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FORPHYSICAL HARM § 33, Reporters'
Note to cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002) (collecting cases "affmning
a foreseeability standard for intervening acts").
19' See, e.g., Camp v. Loughran, 285 A.2d 483, 484 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)
(finding a sexual assault of a "ski weekend" participant by other participants was
an unforeseeable act, severing any causal connection); Medcalf v. Washington
Heights Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 747 A.2d 532,536 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (finding that
assault of a person outside a building was an unforeseeable act arising from the
failure to maintain the building's intercom system, relieving the negligent
defendant of liability); Cope v. Enter. Rent-A-Car, 551 S.E.2d 841 (Ga. Ct. App.
2001) (finding assault upon truck renter whose truck broke down to be an
unforeseeable act, breaking the causal connection). See also 1 DOBBS, supra note
150, § 180, at 444 ("if a second person or a new force unforeseeably intervenes to
trigger the plaintiff's injury after the defendant's act is complete, responsibility for
the injury falls solely upon the second actor"); 1 id. at 470-71 ("If an intervening
and unforeseeable intentional harm or criminal act triggers the injury to the
plaintiff, the criminal act is ordinarily called a superseding cause, with the result
that the defendant who negligently creates the opportunity for such acts escapes
liability.").
199 See, e.g., Medeiros v. Whitcraft, 931 F. Supp. 68, 75 (D. Mass. 1996)
(applying Massachusetts law); Duphily v. Delaware Elec. Coop., Inc., 662 A.2d
821, 831 (Del. 1995); N. Georgia Elec. Membership Corp. v. Webb, 540 S.E.2d
271, 274 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); May v. Parke, Davis & Co., 370 N.W.2d 371, 419
(Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Micro Enhancement Int'l, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP,
40 P.3d 1206, 1216 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002); Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1094
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determinations outside the intervening act context. 200 The traditional
approach now represents the strong majority rule.20'
3. The Restatement Third Approach
Just as changes in the underlying substantive law in the middle of the
twentieth century gave rise to a rejection of the historical approach in favor
of the traditional approach,20 2 further changes in substantive law in the
latter part of the twentieth century have prompted courts, commentators,
and the Restatement Third Reporters to revisit the question of what the
proper analysis should be when intervening acts combine with an actor's
negligence to factually cause indivisible harm.20 3
a. Changes That Warrant Further Change
The substantive law developments that served as catalysts for this re-
examination are: (i) the widespread abrogation or modification ofjoint and
several liability, and (ii) the emergence of principles of comparative fault.
While these changes in substantive law are, in and of themselves, sufficient
to warrant a re-examination of the traditional approach in favor of the
Restatement Third approach, they are not the only reasons. As discussed
below, the Restatement Third approach has the additional advantage of
being analytically faithful to the underlying foundations of proximate cause
analysis and is thus the superior approach.
(Wyo. 1985).
200 See City of St. Louis v. American Tobacco Co., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1014
(E.D. Mo. 1999) (applying Montana law); Pollard v. Union Pacific R.R., 54
S.W.3d 559, 562 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001); Barkley v. Freeman, 827 P.2d 774, 778
(Kan. Ct. App. 1992). See generally 1 DOBBS, supra note 150, § 182, at 449-50
("proximate cause issues are for the jury to decide unless the issue is so clear that
reasonable people could not differ").
20! RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 33,
Reporters' Note cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002) ("A strong majority
of courts employ a foreseeabilty test for independent intervening acts that consist
of culpable conduct by another."). Accord 1 DOBBS, supra note 150, § 190, at 472
("Today's courts usually recognize that foreseeability, in the nature of things, is
fact-specific, so they now often permit juries to find that a criminal act was
foreseeable and not a superseding cause.").
202 See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
203 See infra notes 204-42 and accompanying text.
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i. joint and several liability
As is well-chronicled elsewhere, the 1970s and 1980s brought a wealth
of tort reform by both courts and legislatures." 4 One of the most significant
of these reforms was the elimination, in whole or in part, of joint and
several liability.2" 5 Under joint and several liability, when two or more
tortfeasors are jointly liable for harm caused to another, the tortfeasors are
individually and collectively liable for the entirety of the damages
suffered.0 6 This means that even if one tortfeasor is only fractionally
responsible, that tortfeasor can be forced to pay the entire amount of the
judgment. Therefore, under a system ofjoint and several liability, there are
only two possible outcomes for a potentially responsible tortfeasor--0% or
100%.207 If the tortfeasor is found to be liable in any amount, then that
tortfeasor can be held responsible for the whole amount.2 8 The perceived
unfairness to a fractionally responsible tortfeasor, which is inherent in this
system, led courts to search for ways to diminish this unfairness. Over the
years, courts have utilized several legal developments in this quest.20 9
204 See generally Green, supra note 177, at 1117 n.83; Joseph Sanders & Craig
Joyce, "Off to the Races ": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27
HOus. L. REV. 207, 210 n.13, 220-22 (1990); Aaron D. Twerski, The Joint
Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A Rational Response to the Critics, 22 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1125, 1125-26 (1989).
205 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.5 (West 1987); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.81 (West 1997); MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.230 (2000). See also James
Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, 71 A.B.A. J. 60 passim (July
1985).
206 See, e.g., Tucker v. Union Oil Co., 603 P.2d 156, 165 (Idaho 1979),
overruled by State v. Alger, 764 P.2d 119 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988) (noting that, under
joint and several liability, "each tortfeasor whose negligence is a proximate cause
of an indivisible injury remains individually liable for all compensable damages
attributable to that injury" (quoting Am. Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 578
P.2d 899, 902 (Cal. 1978)); Layman v. Braunschweigische Maschinenbauanstalt,
Inc., 343 N.W.2d 334, 348 (N.D. 1983) (noting that, under joint and several
liability, a "'negligent tortfeasor is generally liable for all damage of which his
negligence is a proximate cause'" and that" 'the fact that one of the tortfeasors is
impecunious or otherwise immune from suit does not relieve another tortfeasor of
his liability for damage which he himself has proximately caused"' (quoting Am.
Motorcycle, 578 P.2d at 899)).
207 See Green, supra note 177, at 1132 ("defendant is subject to liability for the
entire damages ... ifjoint and several liability [is] retained. Courts may be tempted
to employ superseding cause to avoid what might appear to be excessive liability.
Yet, doing so leaves the entirety of the loss on the plaintiff.").
208 See supra note 206.
209 See infra notes 210-42 and accompanying text.
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A hypothetical fact scenario will serve to illustrate the jurisprudential
evolution toward a more precise, and arguably more fair, apportionment of
damages. Assume a drunk driver hits a jogger on a dark road at night.
Assume the driver did not see the jogger because: (i) the driver's perception
is greatly impaired by alcohol; (ii) a street light maintained by the city is
burned out and this was known by the city; and (iii) the jogger was not
wearing reflective clothing. Assume that a jury would find that all three
parties breached a duty of care and were factual causes of the accident, and
that the jury would apportion fault, if asked to do so, as follows:
Drunk Driver: 90%
City: 5%
Jogger: 5%
ii. the evolution of comparative fault
Under the common law system of contributory negligence, a plaintiff
is completely barred from recovering if that plaintiff is found to be even
fractionally responsible for her own injuries. 2 0 Accordingly, even a
plaintiff who was 5% responsible for her own damages would be able to
recover nothing. This rule was designed, at least in part, to prevent a
plaintiff who was a factual cause of her own injuries from using the court
system to seek compensation from others. This, however, gives the court
only two possible alternatives in assessing a plaintiffs liability--all or
nothing (i.e., the plaintiff is 0% responsible or 100% responsible). In other
words, an injured plaintiff is either able to recover all of her damages or
none. This complete bar to recovery may seem fair when a plaintiff is 90%
responsible (close to 100%), but seems patently unfair when that plaintiff
is only 5% responsible (close to 0%). Why should a 5% responsible
plaintiff have to bear 100% of the loss?
Applying contributory negligence to the drunk driving hypothetical, the
jogger would be completely barred from recovery because she was found
to be 5% responsible. As is clear from this hypothetical, while contributory
negligence protects defendants against plaintiffs who are at least partially
responsible for their own injuries, it often unfairly imposes all of the costs
upon fractionally responsible plaintiffs. It is also rather imprecise in
allocating costs in accordance with responsibility.?"
210 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 150, § 199, at 494; PROSSER, supra note 29, at 416.
21 This is particularly true when joint and several liability operates concur-
rently. See supra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
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Out of this unfairness and imprecision grew dissatisfaction with
contributory negligence," 2 and ultimately rejection of this system by all but
four states.213 In its place came a system of comparative negligence (later
called comparative fault), under which a plaintiff is not completely barred
from recovering her damages merely because she was apportioned a certain
percentage of the fault.214 Instead, the plaintiff's damage award is reduced
in proportion with her allocated fault.2"5 Therefore, in the above hypotheti-
cal, the jogger would be able to recover 95% percent of her damages from
the two defendants." 6 While this shift to comparative negligence reaches
a more precise outcome and eliminates the unfairness to plaintiffs under
contributory negligence, it fails to address the potential unfairness in the
allocation of liability among defendants.
iii. equitable indemnity
Under the common law system ofjoint and several liability, a plaintiff
was entitled to collect her entire judgment against any of the jointly liable
defendants, even if the defendant chosen was only fractionally
responsible.2"7 That defendant, however, had no right to seek contribution
or indemnity against any other jointly liable defendant.2"8 Consequently, a
212 See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Cal. 1975) (character-
izing contributory negligence as "inequitable in its operation because it fails to
distribute responsibility in proportion to fault"); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431,
437 (Fla. 1973) (rejecting a rule of contributory negligence and accepting a rule of
comparative negligence because comparative negligence "is simply a more
equitable system of determining liability and a more socially desirable method of
loss distribution"); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1239 (N.M. 1981) (holding that
"the contributory negligence rule has long since reached that point of obsoles-
cence"); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 883-84 (W. Va.
1979) (recognizing that "there is an obvious injustice in the .. .contributory
negligence rule").
2 3 VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1-2, at 4 (3d ed. 1994)
(Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia). See also Steven Gardner,
Contributory Negligence, Comparative Negligence, and Stare Decisis in North
Carolina, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 37-38 (1996).
214 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 150, § 201, at 503.
2I5 lid. § 201, at 503-04.
216 This figure is reached by merely subtracting the 5% attributable to the
plaintiff from the overall 100% of fault.
217 See supra note 207.
2,8 See George W. Lumber Co. v. Bush, 116 N.E. 480, 481 (Mass. 1917)
(holding that "[t]here can be no contribution enforced in the courts between joint
wrongdoers in the ordinary case. Each is left by the law where his wrongful act
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defendant who was 5% responsible could end up paying the entire
judgment without any recourse against any other defendant. Applying this
system to the drunk driving hypothetical, and assuming the plaintiff chose
to recover against the city, it would have to pay 95% of the plaintiffs
damages without any recourse against the drunk driver.
Over time, the unfairness of completely prohibiting indemnity led
courts to abandon this harsh rule.219 Jurisdictions began allowing the
defendant against whom a plaintiff collected to seek indemnity on a pro rata
basis from other defendants.22 Under this system, assuming plaintiff chose
to recover against the city, it would have to pay 95% of the plaintiff's
damages, but could then seek to collect half (47.5%) of the plaintiffs
damages from the drunk driver.22 1 While more precise and more fair, courts
were not completely satisfied with this approach either because it still
failed to place the ultimate costs on defendants in proportion to their
allocated percentages of fault.222 Ultimately, courts adopted a system of
leaves him."); 1 DOBBS, supra note 150, § 386, at 1078; Robert A. Leflar,
Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130, 130
(1932).
219 See, e.g., Am. Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 578 P.2d 899, 902 (Cal.
1978) (adopting a system of "equitable indemnity" to conform to the "objective of
establishing 'a system under which liability for damage will be borne by those
whose negligence caused it in direct proportion to their respective fault'" (quoting
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1232 (Cal. 1975))).
220 See, e.g., Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 398 A.2d 490,514 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, GNC v. Lahocki, 410 A.2d 1039 (Md.
1980) (applying pro rata contribution determined purely by "shares or proportions
based on the number of tortfeasors"). See also Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act § 2, 12 U.L.A. 246 (1955) ("[i]n determining the pro rata shares
of tortfeasors in the entire liability (a) their relative degrees of fault shall not be
considered").
221 The risk that this amount was uncollectible from the drunk driver was borne
by the city. See supra note 207.
222 See, e.g., Bielski v. Schulze, 114 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. 1962), overruled on
other grounds by Wangan v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. 1980). In
Bielski, the court noted:
If the doctrine is to do equity, there is no reason in logic or in natural
justice why the shares of common liability ofjoint tortfeasors should not be
translated into the percentage of the causal negligence which contributed to
the injury. This is merely a refinement of the equitable principle. It is
difficult to justify, either on a layman's sense ofjustice or on natural justice,
why a joint tortfeasor who is 5% causally negligent should only recover
50% of the amount he paid to the plaintiff from a co-tortfeasor who is 95%
causally negligent, and conversely why the defendant who is found 5%
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equitable indemnity,223 under which a defendant against whom plaintiff
collected could seek indemnity in proportion to the percentage of fault
allocated to the remaining defendant(s).224 Under the drunk driving
hypothetical, the city would be able to seek indemnity from the drunk
driver in an amount equal to 90% of plaintiffs damages.225 The risk of
uncollectibility, however, due to the insolvency of the drunk driver, still
rests with the city.
iv. abrogation ofjoint and several liability
In the mid-1980s, courts and legislatures in many states abandoned or
modified common law joint and several liability in favor of a several
liability system.226 Under several liability, parties are legally responsible
only for the proportion of damages assigned to them by the jury. Many
other states have substantially modified joint and several liability such that
joint and several liability applies to only certain types of claims 227 or certain
types of damages.228 Under the drunk driving hypothetical in a several
liability jurisdiction the city would be responsible for paying only 5% of
the jogger's damages. The jogger would have to collect the remaining 90%
of damages from the drunk driver. Consequently, under a several liability
system, the risk that the drunk driver will be unable to pay the jogger
causally negligent should be required to pay 50% of the loss by way of
reimbursement to the co-tortfeasor who is 95% negligent.
Id. at 109.223 See, e.g., Expressions at Rancho Niguel Ass'n v. Ahmanson Developments,
Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 895, 898 (Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that "[e]quitable
indemnity principles govern the allocation of loss or damages among multiple
tortfeasors whose liability for the underlying injury is joint and several" (citing Am.
Motorcyle, 578 P.2d at 899)).
124 Id. at 1140 ("Such principles are designed, generally, to do equity among
defendants who are legally responsible for an indivisible injury by providing a
basis on which liability for damage will be borne by each joint tortfeasor 'in direct
proportion to [its] respective fault."' (quoting Am. Motorcyle, 578 P.2d at 899)).
225 This is true because the city would be responsible first to pay thejogger 95%
of her damages because this represents the defendants' share of responsibility. The
city could then seek reimbursement of 90% of the damages, which represents the
drunk driver's allocated share of responsibility.
226 Only fifteen states still retain joint and several liability. See Green, supra
note 177, at 1105.
227 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 150, § 389, at 1087.
228 1 id.
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because of lack of insurance and/or insolvency is borne by the jogger, not
by the city.
2 9
The rejection ofjoint and several liability, in whole or part, thus seems
to complete the jurisprudential evolution from an imprecise and unfair
apportionment of ultimate liability to a precise and fair system where both
plaintiffs and defendants bear ultimate liability in direct proportion to their
assigned percentages of fault. Not quite. One noteworthy exception to this
precise and fair system is the traditional approach to intervening acts and
superseding causes.
As discussed above, the traditional approach to intervening acts and
superseding causes requires the jury to ascertain whether, following an
actor's negligent act, the intervening culpable conduct of another tortfeasor
is foreseeable or unforeseeable.230 If the intervening act is foreseeable, then
the original actor remains liable to the injured party.231 If the intervening act
is not foreseeable, then the original actor is not liable because the interven-
ing act will be deemed to be a superseding cause.232 Because this approach
was developed when joint and several liability was the uniform rule, it was
necessarily limited to one of two possible outcomes. The original actor was
either completely responsible for all of the damages attributable to any
defendant (100%), or not responsible for any of the damages (0%).233 This
approach does not mesh with a system that equitably apportions fault,234 or
with one that has rejected or modified common law joint and several
liability,235 because it is ill-equipped to achieve the same level of precision
and fairness these changes have brought.236
Under the traditional approach to the drunk driving hypothetical, the
city would bear no responsibility whatsoever for the jogger's injuries if the
jury determined that the drunk driver was an unforeseeable criminal
229 See l id. § 387, at 1082.
230 See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
231 See supra note 197.
232 See supra note 198.
233 See supra note 207.
234 See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
235 See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
236 To say that the traditional approach is ill-equipped to operate efficiently
within a comparative fault system is not to say that it is entirely incompatible. In
fact, the United States Supreme Court recently determined that the adoption of
comparative fault does not ipsofacto mean that intervening act/superseding cause
analysis is thereby rejected. See Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830,
835 (1996) (declaring that there is nothing "internally inconsistent" with having a
superseding cause analysis in the context of comparative fault).
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intervening act.237 This is true even if the jury really thought that the city,
in fairness, should bear a 5% share of the damages. To be sure, under a
joint and several liability system, finding the drunk driver's intervening act
to be a superseding cause and thus holding the city responsible for 0% of
the damages would be more fair and more precise than would be a finding
that the city was responsible for 100% of the damages attributable to the
defendants--especially if the drunk driver was insolvent.23 This is true
because 5% (the precise proportion of fault that the city would otherwise
be assigned) is much closer to 0% than it is to 100%. But why should we
limit ourselves to all or nothing, when we now have the tools and experi-
ence to allow us to be precise?239 Equitable apportionment of fault and
several liability (in most states) now allow this precision and fairness.
240
Accordingly, the time for leaving behind the intervening act/superseding
cause analysis has come.241 The Restatement Third approach, which
accomplishes precisely that, should be adopted.242
237 This is true because drunk driving comfortably fits within the definition of
a criminal act.
238 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 33,
cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002) (allowing that under a system ofjoint
and several liability, "reliance on superseding cause to eliminate the liability of
negligent tortfeasors when there were other, more culpable tortfeasors who were
a cause of the injury was quite attractive and understandable").
239 See Green, supra note 177, at 1104 ("Employing a 100-unit scale for
apportioning liability meant courts no longer had to choose from the crude array of
tools for apportioning liability among the parties to a suit, which sometimes
required selecting the tool that produced the lesser of two evils.").
240 Accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM
§ 33 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002). The comment states:
The advent of comparative responsibility, comparative contribution, and
substantial modification ofjoint and several liability also has undermined
one important rationale for these rules-namely the use of scope of liability
to prevent a modestly negligent tortfeasor from being held liable for the
entirety of another's harm when the tortious acts of other, more culpable
persons were also a cause of the harm.
Id.
241 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 33
Reporters' Note cmt. c ("Thus, in many jurisdictions today, the concern that a
negligent tortfeasor, whose comparative culpability is quite modest by contrast to
an intentional tortfeasor who was also a cause of the harm, may be subject to
liability for all of the harm, no longer exists.").
242 This is subject to one important caveat. In jurisdictions that have either not
adopted comparative fault principles or have retained joint and several liability, the
traditional approach may continue to be preferable because the full range of options
[VOL. 91
2002-2003] (PROPOSED) RESTATEMENT THIRD OF TORTS
b. The Language of Section 33
Section 33 of the Restatement Third addresses the situation that has
heretofore fallen under the category of intervening acts and superseding
causes. Section 33 provides:
§ 33. Intervening Acts and Superseding Causes
(a) When an actor's tortious conduct is a factual cause of harm that is
among the harms whose risks made the actor's conduct tortious, the actor
is subject to liability for the harm even if an unforeseeable intervening act,
including an unusual force of nature or independent culpable or noncul-
pable human act, is also a factual cause of the harm.
(b) When, after an actor's tortious conduct occurs, another act, including
an unusual force of nature or independent human act, occurs and both the
tortious conduct and other act are factual causes of harm different from
the harm whose risks made the actor's conduct tortious, the actor is not
liable for any such harm.
24 3
Under subsection (a), even if the intervening act is an entirely unforesee-
able criminal act, the original actor can still be liable for the harm suffered
by the plaintiff. Likewise, under subsection (b), even if the intervening act
is perfectly foreseeable from the standpoint of the original actor, that actor
may still not be liable. Section 33 emphatically rejects the traditional
approach and declares that approach's foundational question of whether or
not the intervening act was foreseeable entirely irrelevant.
Section 33 instead focuses the inquiry on whether the type of harm
suffered by the injured party was within the scope of risk presented by the
original actor's tortious conduct. If the type of harm suffered was one of the
risks the occurrence of which rendered the original actor's conduct tortious
in the first instance, then that actor is liable regardless of whether the
intervening act was foreseeable or unforeseeable, and even regardless of
(0% - 100%) are not available. Accordingly, finding a marginally responsible
actor's negligence to be entirely superseded by a later, more responsible interven-
ing actor's conduct would be more fair than holding the original actor entirely
responsible. Accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25,2002) ("Jurisdictions that retain joint
and several liability and which do not permit apportionment between negligent and
intentional tortfeasors would have the strongest grounds for rejecting the ...
[Restatement Third approach].").
243 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 33
(Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002).
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whether there was an intervening act at all.244 Conversely, if the type of
harm suffered was not one of the risks that rendered the original actor's
conduct tortious, then that actor is not liable at all, even if a foreseeable
intervening act helped to cause that harm.
This is not to say that foreseeability no longer plays any role in
determining whether an intervening act can relieve the original actor of
liability. To the contrary, foreseeability still plays a vital role in this
determination. The difference is in where the foreseeability inquiry is
focused. Under the traditional approach, the foreseeability spotlight is
aimed at the intervening act. If that intervening act is foreseeable, then
there is liability; if unforeseeable, then there is no liability. In contrast,
under the Restatement Third approach, the foreseeability spotlight is aimed
at the ultimate harm caused. If that harm is within the scope of risk that
makes the actor's conduct tortious, then that actor is liable. This scope of
risk inquiry is merely a more precise, but somewhat more complicated, way
of asking whether or not the ultimate harm suffered was foreseeable from
the standpoint of the actor at the time of the conduct at issue. Likewise, if
the ultimate harm is not foreseeable from the standpoint of the actor (again,
regardless of whether or not an intervening act, if any, was foreseeable),
then the actor is not liable.
This approach amounts to nothing more and nothing less than a
straightforward application of the proximate cause test urged by Section
29.245 The fact that this approach removes an extra layer of inquiry in the
proximate cause analysis by simply applying the general rule (without
having to take the additional step of asking whether there was a foreseeable
or unforeseeable intervening act) may be a sufficient reason in and of itself
to prefer it over the traditional approach. But this is not the only reason (or
even the best reason) that the Restatement Third approach is superior to the
traditional approach. The Restatement Third approach is also analytically
superior to the traditional approach because it assigns liability where it
properly belongs for the precise reasons it belongs there.
As discussed in Part I of this Article, Section 29 imposes liability upon
actors only if the probability that the harm ultimately suffered would occur,
when coupled with the gravity of the harm risked, is sufficiently high that
a reasonable person would not engage in the conduct for fear of causing the
244 See id. § 33 cmt. e ("Even when the intervening acts are unforeseeable and
even when the basis for finding the actor negligent is not specifically the risk
created by those intervening acts, whether negligent or intentional, this subsection
does not relieve the actor from liability.").
245 Id. § 33, cmt. a ("[t]his section adopts a rule on scope of liability that is
functionally the same as § 29").
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precise type of harm suffered.246 In other words, before engaging in the
conduct at issue, the reasonable person would recognize that the probability
of causing the harm actually suffered multiplied by the gravity of that harm
outweighed the potential benefit of engaging in the conduct at issue, and as
a consequence, would not engage in that conduct.
While the linguistic formulation of the proximate cause rule and its
application to the intervening act, superseding cause context may appear to
be somewhat novel, the underlying foundational changes it brings about are
relatively minor, if they exist at all. That this is true is being recognized by
an increasing number of courts and commentators. 2 In addition, when the
rubber actually meets the road, the results reached under the traditional
approach and the Restatement Third approach will actually diverge
somewhat infrequently. In the small minority of cases in which the result
turns upon which of the approaches is applied, the Restatement Third is
usually the best approach to follow.
a. The Role of Foreseeability in the Restatement Third Approach
The Restatement Third's "scope of risk" standard may, at first, feel a
bit unfamiliar and awkward because the term "foreseeability" is conspicu-
ously absent. However, the foreseeability concept, when properly defined
and understood, is very much a part of the scope of risk inquiry.248 Indeed,
the scope of risk terminology is what defines the role foreseeability ought
to play in the proximate cause analysis. The level of foreseeability that the
ultimate harm will occur actually dictates the value of P in the B<PL
equation. That is, the more foreseeable it is that someone will be injured by
246 See supra notes 43-76 and accompanying text.
247 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM § 33 Reporters' Note, cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002)
(collecting cases documenting recognition that principles of comparative fault
minimizes if not eliminates the need for intervening act, superseding cause
analysis); SCHWARTZ, supra note 213, § 4-5(b), at 102-04; Terry Christlieb, Note,
Why Superseding Cause Analysis Should be Abandoned, 72 TEX. L. REv. 161, 165
(1993).
248 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 29 cmt.
k (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002) ("Properly understood, [the Restatement
approach] ... exclude[s] liability for harms that were sufficiently unforeseeable at
the time of the actor's tortious conduct that they were not among the risks-
potential harms--that made the actor negligent" (emphasis added)); id. § 29 cmt.
j ("Currently, virtually all jurisdictions employ the risk standard, or its equivalent
in negligence cases, foreseeability, for some range of proximate-cause issues."
(emphasis added)).
2002-2003]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the actor's conduct, the higher we say the probability of injury is. Likewise,
the greater the gravity of harm that is foreseeable, the higher the value of
L in the B<PL equation. Stated another way, the more foreseeable it is that
someone will be hurt badly, the higher the gravity of harm risked.249
In the context of the intervening act, superseding cause analysis,
determining whether or not the intervening act was foreseeable goes a long
way toward predicting whether liability ought to be imposed.250 Instead,
while it might be an easy-to-understand, though imperfect and imprecise,
description of what the inquiry actually involves, it still remains only a
rough proxy for the controlling question of whether the harm caused was
within the scope of risk that rendered the actor's conduct tortious in the
first instance. Whether or not an actor can foresee someone or something
intervening after the actor's conduct remains an abstract question unless
tethered to the ultimate harm caused by the combination of original conduct
and intervening act. This is demonstrably true because whether or not the
intervening act occurs has no bearing on liability unless the ultimate harm
also occurs. It is the ultimate harm that animates the lawsuit, not the
intervening act."'
For example, if a landlord fails to repair a lock to an apartment
complex in a high crime area, one of the foreseeable risks is that a criminal
will enter the complex. The landlord will not be sued and thus will have no
liability unless the ultimate harm risked (e.g., rape of a tenant) actually
occurs. If a criminal merely enters through the gate and then leaves having
committed no crime, then we have a foreseeable intervening act but no
ultimate harm. Therefore, it is the harm that animates the lawsuit, rather
than the act. Certainly one could argue that the intervening act that needs
to be foreseeable is the entry by the criminal and the act of committing the
rape. While this may be true, if one defines the act as including the harm
249 Id. § 29 cmt. f("The magnitude of the risk is the foreseeable severity of the
harm discounted by the foreseeable probability that it will occur.").
250 See id. § 29 cmt. k ("The risk standard provides greater clarity and facilitates
analysis because it focuses attention on the particular circumstances that existed at
the time of the actor's conduct and the risks that were posed by that conduct.").
Accord 1 DOBBS, supra note 150, § 190, at 471 ("As in other superseding cause
cases, the real reason to relieve the defendant of liability is not merely that a new
cause has intervened but rather that the risk represented is not one that the
defendant negligently created.").
251 1 DOBBS, supra note 150, § 193, at 483 ("[T]he superseding cause
determination is quite often merely a specific instance of and a way of talking about
the fundamental rule that liability is limited to the risks that the defendant has
negligently imposed.").
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caused by the act, then one has succeeded in proving the uselessness of the
inquiry into the act in the first place. In other words, if the act includes
within it the assumption of the harm, then there is no reason not to focus
solely on the harm. The inquiry into whether or not the act was foreseeable
is thus empty unless the harm is included in the definition of the act.252 As
a practical matter, if a reasonable person can foresee that his or her conduct
presents the risk that an intervening act is sufficiently likely to cause a
foreseeable type of harm which is sufficiently grave, then, almost by
definition, that harm falls within the scope of risk presented by that conduct
and liability will attach.
The recognition that the traditional and the Restatement Third
approaches essentially accomplish the same goals is not particularly
controversial. For example, in his respected treatise, Professor Dobbs
explains, "[a]n intervening act is regarded as a superseding cause when it
is outside the scope of the risk the defendant negligently created. This idea
is usually expressed in shorthand by saying that if the intervening act is
itself unforeseeable, then it may become a superseding cause." '253 But if the
intervening cause analysis is simply a "shorthand" way (arguably an
analytically imprecise and somewhat flawed "shorthand" way) of applying
the scope of risk standard, then why should we continue to apply it? Indeed,
as Dobbs further recognizes, "[t]he intervening cause cases all entail
questions about the scope of the risk, so they can be resolved without a
mention of intervening or superseding causes. ' Lately, an increasing
number of courts have come to realize just that and are applying what
amounts to the Restatement Third approach,255 though their application
appears to be uneven.256
232 See 1 id. § 190, at 471 ("If the harm caused by an intervening actor's
criminal act is within the risk negligently created by the defendant, foreseeability
of the criminal act itself seems unimportant.").
23 1 id. § 193, at 482; see also I id. § 186, at 462 ("Put more generally, an
intervening cause does not supersede the defendant's negligence when it reflects
the same general kind of risk which rendered the defendant negligent.").
254 1 id. § 183, at 452; see also id. § 186, at 460 ("[I]n some instances, the
second actor causes a harm that may be outside the scope of the risk originally
created by the first. Such cases are simply subsets or particular examples of the
basic scope of the risk problem and can be resolved under ordinary foreseeability
rules."). By "ordinary foreseeability rules" Dobbs means scope of risk principles.
25 See, e.g., Sharp v. Town of Highland, 665 N.E.2d 610,617-18 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996). See also supra note 248.
256 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 150, at 452 ("[I]n some cases, courts selectively
ignore intervening cause analysis while in others they reach out for it. If the result
is the same overall, the language of the opinions is not, so the distinction cannot be
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Applying the Restatement Third approach to the drunk driver hypothet-
ical shows its superiority. Under the Restatement Third approach, the jury
would first ascertain what risks were presented by the city's failure to
replace a burned-out light on a dark road. In doing so, the jury would
decide how probable it was that this type of harm would occur and how
grave the danger would be to the public. Then the jury would compare the
probability and gravity of the danger to how much of a burden it would
have been to change the bulb before the accident.
If the jury determined that the burden to the city of changing the bulb
before the accident was greater than the small likelihood that a jogger
would be hit by a drunk driver at that very point in the road,257 then there
would be no liability because the failure to change the bulb could not be
said to have been a proximate cause of the jogger's injuries. If, however,
the jury found that the burden of changing the bulb was less than the
probability of the harm multiplied by its gravity, then the jury would find
proximate cause. In making these determinations, the jury would not be
limited to an all or nothing apportionment, but would have the full range of
0% to 100% available to them. Assuming the jury found the city to be 5%
at fault, then in the majority of courts, the city would have to pay 5%, and
only 5%, of the jogger's damages. Therefore, the Restatement Third
approach is superior because it operates within the current analytical
framework and reaches the most precise and fair result.
III. APPLICATION TO SEPTEMBER 1 1TH
Each of the three approaches outlined in Part H can be applied to the
September 11 th tragedy to ascertain how ajury might decide the proximate
cause question if asked to do so. In applying the historical, traditional, and
Restatement Third approaches, this Article assumes the following material
facts to be undisputed:
(1) The airlines employed and trained the security guards who
screened the passengers as they boarded the planes;
(2) The hijackers passed through the airlines' security prior to
boarding the planes;
(3) The airlines utilized screening equipment that was capable of
detecting two-inch blades carried by passengers attempting to
board the planes;
wholly ignored.").
257 An example would be if the city had reasonably discovered that the bulb was
burned out only moments before the accident.
[VOL. 91
(PROPOSED) RESTATEMENT THIRD OF TORTS
(4) The airlines instructed their security guards to allow passengers to
board the planes while carrying two-inch blades;
(5) The hijackers boarded the planes carrying box-cutters with two-
inch blades;
(6) The hijackers gained control of the planes after they were airborne
by brandishing the box-cutters with two-inch blades;
(7) After gaining control of the planes, the hijackers flew the planes
into the World Trade Center Towers; and
(8) Thousands of individuals were injured or killed when the planes
struck the World Trade Center Towers.
Having made these assumptions,258 it is now possible to analyze the
proximate cause question under each of the three approaches.
A. The Historical Approach
Under the historical approach, an actor who engages in tortious conduct
is relieved of liability if a criminal or intentionally tortious act intervenes
and is also a factual cause of the harm suffered.259 This type of intervening
act is deemed to be unforeseeable as a matter of law and is treated as a
superseding cause.260 While this historical approach has almost completely
fallen out of favor with courts and commentators,261 one could make a
compelling policy-based argument that terrorist attacks can and should be
treated differently than other criminal actions.262
Applying the historical approach to the undisputed material facts263 is
simple and straightforward. We have a breach of duty by the airlines,
assuming that a jury would find that the airlines have breached a duty of
care in allowing the terrorists onto the planes with box-cutters with two-
inch blades.264 In addition, it is beyond dispute that allowing the terrorists
238 All of the assumed facts are likely to be undisputed at trial.
29 See supra notes 173-95 and accompanying text.
260 See supra notes 173-95.
261 See supra note 193.
262 That Congress found such a policy-based argument for treating injuries from
a terrorist attack persuasive is demonstrated by the speed with which it passed the
September 11 Victim Compensation Fund legislation and the breadth of that
legislation. See September 11 Victims Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-42, §§ 401-09, 115 Stat. 230 (2001).
263 Once again, I am assuming the above facts will be undisputed.
264 1 fully realize this is a huge assumption that will be hotly contested. I also
realize that assuming this fact in many ways overlaps with what I argue is the
proper way to perform the proximate cause inquiry. Nevertheless, assuming there
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onto the plane with the box-cutters was a factual cause of the harm
suffered. The attention then turns to whether there was an intervening act
that was also a factual cause of the ultimate harm. Because the terrorists
hijacked the plane after the airlines breached a duty of care, the terrorists'
actions are properly deemed to be intervening acts. Because the hijacking
and crashing of the planes into the World Trade Center Towers is both
criminal and intentionally tortious, then under the historical approach the
intervening acts of the terrorists would be deemed to be superseding causes
as a matter of law. Accordingly, the airlines would be relieved of all
liability for the resulting damages.
B. The Traditional Approach
Most of the analysis under the traditional approach is identical to that
of the historical approach. Under the traditional approach, the original
tortious actor is relieved of liability only if the intervening criminal or
intentionally tortious act is unforeseeable.265 Accordingly, the analysis
begins with the determination of whether or not the actor breached a duty
of due care. The focus then turns to determining whether or not that
conduct was a factual cause of the ultimate harm. Assuming both questions
are answered in the affirmative, then one must determine whether there was
an intervening act that was also a factual cause of the ultimate harm. If
there was an intervening act that was also a factual cause of the ultimate
harm, the dispositive question is whether that intervening act was foresee-
able from the standpoint of the original actor. If it was foreseeable, then the
original actor is liable. If it was unforeseeable, then the intervening act is
deemed to have been a superseding cause and the original actor is not
liable.26
Applying the traditional approach to the September 11 th facts is almost
as simple a task as under the historical approach, but less clear in the
answer it yields. As under the historical approach, the airlines can be
assumed to have breached a duty of care and to be a factual cause of the
harm.267 Moreover, the terrorists' actions followed the airlines' breach and
was a breach of a duty, at least in the abstract, is a necessary pre-requisite to an in-
depth proximate cause analysis because whether there was a breach of a duty is
always determined before proximate cause. For the actual analysis as to whether
there was a such a breach, see infra notes 297-99 and accompanying text.
265 See supra note 197.
266 See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
267See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
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are both intervening acts and factual causes of the harm. Accordingly, the
sole remaining question is whether these intervening acts were foreseeable
from the standpoint of the airlines. To be clear, under the traditional
approach, the focus is on whether the intervening acts were foreseeable,268
whereas under the Restatement Third approach, the focus is on whether the
ultimate harm was foreseeable or within the scope of risk.269
Whether the intervening acts were foreseeable is, of course, a jury
question.27 As discussed in Part I, the ultimate answer to this question will
turn upon the level of generality the jury chooses to apply to the foreseea-
bility question.27" ' The plaintiffs will argue for a very broad view of
foreseeability, while the airlines will argue for a very narrow view of
foreseeability.272 Accordingly, how the foreseeability question is ultimately
framed in the jurors' minds will likely determine the outcome of the case.
1. The Airlines'Argument
The airlines will attempt to convince the jury to view foreseeability in
specific terms. They might phrase the dispositive foreseeability question
like this: "Unless you find that it is foreseeable that individuals allowed
onto a plane in Boston with two-inch blades will hijack the plane and
intentionally fly it into a skyscraper in New York, you must find that
[United or American] was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries."
Under this formulation, the answer seems to be relatively easy. Of
course it is not reasonably foreseeable that letting individuals carrying two-
inch blades onto a plane in Boston will cause death or serious injury to
workers in a skyscraper in New York and cause the destruction of that
building. Therefore, by successfully framing the question in very narrow
terms, the airlines will likely prevail on the proximate cause question.
268 See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
269 See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
270 See supra note 199.
271 See supra notes 137-52 and accompanying text. The level of generality dis-
cussion in Part I took place in the context of the Restatement Third approach to
intervening act/superseding cause analysis. See supra notes 137-52 and accompa-
nying text. But this same level of generality determination will have to made in
the traditional approach analysis because the level of foreseeability plays an
integral part under each approach, see supra notes 244-56 and accompanying text,
albeit with a slightly different focus, see supra notes 244-45 and accompanying
text.
272 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 150, at 468 ("As a matter of argumentation, it
always serves the defendant to describe the risk as precisely as possible and the
plaintiff to describe it as abstractly as possible.").
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2. Plaintiffs'Argument
In contrast, plaintiffs will attempt to convince the jury to view
foreseeability in very broad terms. Plaintiffs might phrase the dispositive
foreseeability question like this: "If you find that allowing individuals onto
a plane with two-inch blades creates a foreseeable risk of personal injury
or property damage to others, then you must find that [United or American]
was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries."
Under such a formulation, the answer also seems to be relatively easy,
though very different. Of course it is foreseeable that individuals on
airplanes carrying two-inch blades might cause personal injury or property
damage to others. Therefore, by successfully framing the question in very
broad terms, the plaintiffs will likely prevail on the proximate cause
question.273
C. The Restatement Third Approach
Under the Restatement Third approach, the focus is on whether at the
time of the actor's conduct, the risk of the harm ultimately caused was
sufficiently high so as to render the actor's conduct tortious.274 In other
words, at the time of the actor's conduct, was the probability of causing the
particular type of harm ultimately suffered multiplied by the gravity of that
harm sufficiently high that a reasonable person would not engage in that
conduct? 75 Once again, under the Restatement Third approach, the focus
... The question of whether intervening terrorist acts are unforeseeable and thus
superseding causes is not entirely novel. See, e.g., Port Authority v. Arcadian
Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 319 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of suit against
fertilizer manufacturer in conjunction with the 1993 terrorist bombing of The
World Trade Center and finding as a matter of law that the bombing was
unforeseeable and thus a superseding cause); Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, 160
F.3d 613, 621 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of suit against ammonium
nitrate manufacturer in conjunction with the bombing of The Murrah Building in
Oklahoma City on grounds that the bombing was unforeseeable and thus a
superseding cause as a matter of law). While these cases seem to suggest that
foreseeability can and should be decided as a matter of law, a more factually
analogous case suggests otherwise. See Stanford v. Kuwait Airways, 89 F.3d 117,
127 (2d Cir. 1996) (reversing grant of airline's motion for judgment as a matter of
law in case brought by passengers injured in hijacking of Kuwait Airways plane
and finding that foreseeability of hijacking is a question of fact for the jury).274 See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 43-76.
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is solely upon the harm that was ultimately suffered rather than upon
whether an intervening act, if any, was foreseeable.276
As with the traditional approach, the outcome will hinge upon the level
of generality one applies to the analysis. 277 The airlines will argue for an
extremely narrow view of the type of harm risked by its conduct, while the
plaintiffs will argue for a broad view of the type of harm risked.
1. The Airlines'Argument
As in the traveling salesman hypothetical used to illustrate how Section
29 of the Restatement Third generally operates,27 the defendants will
attempt to divide the type of harm inquiry into numerous individual risk
blocks. To accomplish this, the airlines will try to convince the jury that
there are numerous discrete types of harms that are risked by allowing
individuals carrying two-inch blades aboard planes, each of which is very
small when compared to the burden on the airlines and on their passengers
of not allowing such blades on planes. Among the types of harm the airlines
might identify are the following:
(1) The passenger carrying the box-cutter might accidentally cut the
person's leg sitting in the next seat;
(2) The passenger carrying the box-cutter might vandalize the tray
table by carving his initials in it;
(3) The passenger carrying the box-cutter might damage the plane in
such a way that it loses pressure at a high altitude causing passen-
gers to suffer ear drum damage and difficulty breathing;
(4) The passenger carrying the box-cutter might cause emotional harm
to passengers on the plane by threatening someone with the blade;
(5) The passenger carrying the box-cutter might intentionally cut
another passenger on the plane;
(6) The passenger carrying the box-cutter might intentionally cut a
flight attendant or pilot on the plane;
(7) The passenger carrying the box-cutter might use the blade to gain
entrance into the cockpit and force the pilot to land the plane at an
unscheduled destination;
(8) The passenger carrying the box-cutter might use the blade to gain
entrance into the cockpit and cause the plane to crash into the
ocean or a desolate area, killing all passengers on board;
276 See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
277 See supra notes 137-52 and accompanying text.
278 See Graphs 7-20 & 23-28.
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(9) The passenger carrying the box-cutter might use the blade to gain
entrance into the cockpit and cause the plane to crash into a corn
field, killing all passengers on board and damaging the corn crops;
and
(10) The passenger carrying the box-cutter might use the blade to gain
entrance into the cockpit and seize control of the plane and then fly
it into a skyscraper, killing many in the building and all passengers
on board.
As is apparent from this list, it is possible to conjure up an almost
infinite list of possible types of harms potentially risked by a given act if
the type of harm is defined narrowly enough.
As in Part I, probability levels and dollar figures for the types of harm
risked can be assigned to each type of harm and plotted onto individual bar
graphs.279 Each bar can then be placed on the same chart and measured
against a value at which the burden of not allowing passengers to carry
such blades onto planes would exactly equal the magnitude of risk that a
reasonable airline would be able to tolerate, for example, B=PL.280 For each
of the ten individual types of harm hypothesized above I will assume the
following projected magnitude of risk (in dollars) per flight:28
1. Accidental cut to passenger: $ .25282
2. Tray table vandalism: $ .28283
279 See Graph 13.
280 See id.
281 These figures are the product of multiplying the probability of this type of
harm occurring on any given flight on which a passenger carrying a two-inch blade
is allowed on board (P) times the estimated gravity of this type of harm calculated
in dollar value (L). The probabilities assigned to each type of harm are the product
of my speculation which is based upon little more than intuition. Nevertheless,
these numbers are necessary to illustrate the concepts at work.
282 This dollar value is derived by assuming that the probability of this type of
harm occurring on any given flight is .005%, and by assuming that the expected
monetary value of this type of injury would be $5,000. Therefore, .005% x
$5,000 = $.25.
283 This dollar value is derived by assuming that the probability of this type of
harm occurring on any given flight is .07%, and by assuming that the expected
monetary value of this type of injury would be $400. Therefore, .07% x $400
$.28.
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3. Loss of cabin pressure: $ 1.00284
4. Emotional harm from threat: $ 6.00285
5. Intentional cut to passenger: $ 6.00286
6. Intentional cut to airline personnel: $ 6.00287
7. Unscheduled landing: $ .20288
8. Crash in water or desolate area: $ 5.00289
9. Crash into corn field: $ 2.5 1290
10. Crash into skyscraper: $ 1.00291
Total: $28.24292
2'4 This dollar value is derived by assuming that the probability of this type of
harm occurring on any given flight is .0001%, and by assuming that the expected
monetary value of this type of injury would be $1,000,000. Therefore, .0001% x
$1,000,000 = $1.00.
285 This dollar value is derived by assuming that the probability of this type of
harm occurring on any given flight is .006%, and by assuming that the expected
monetary value of this type of injury would be $100,000. Therefore, .006% x
$100,000 = $6.00.
286 This dollar value is derived by assuming that the probability of this type of
harm occurring on any given flight is .0006%, and by assuming that the expected
monetary value of this type of injury would be $1,000,000. Therefore, .0006% x
$1,000,000 = $6.00.
287 This dollar value is derived by assuming that the probability of this type of
harm occurring on any given flight is .0006%, and by assuming that the expected
monetary value of this type of injury would be $1,000,000. Therefore, .0006% x
$1,000,000 = $6.00.
288 This dollar value is derived by assuming that the probability of this type of
harm occurring on any given flight is .00002%, and by assuming that the expected
monetary value of this type of injury would be $1,000,000. Therefore, .00002% x
$1,000,000 = $.20.
289 This dollar value is derived by assuming that the probability of this type of
harm occurring on any given flight is .000001%, and by assuming that the expected
monetary value of this type of injury would be $500,000,000. Therefore, .000001%
x $500,000,000 = $5.00.
290 This dollar value is derived by assuming that the probability of this type of
harm occurring on any given flight is .0000005%, and by assuming that the
expected monetary value of this type of injury would be $502,000,000. Therefore,
.0000005% x $502,000,000 = $2.51.
291 This dollar value is derived by assuming that the probability of this type of
harm occurring on any given flight is .00000001%, and by assuming that the
expected monetary value of this type of injury would be $10,000,000,000.
Therefore, .00000001% x $10,000,000,000 = $1.00.
292 This number is merely the sum of the expected values for each individual
type of harm listed.
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Each of the above-listed potential types of harm risked by allowing
passengers to board carrying a two-inch blade can then be depicted on a bar
graph.
293
GRAPH 29:
Risks of Harm
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As shown on the graph, the value at which the probability of harm
multiplied by the gravity of harm equals the burden of preventing passen-
gers from carrying two-inch blades onto the plane is set at $20. This
number represents the projected per flight burden (reduced to dollars) on
the airlines294 of disallowing the blades on planes.
295
293 See Graph 29.
294 This burden reflects, inter alia, the additional cost associated with checking
the passengers' belongings more carefully, and the lost revenue when individuals
choose not to fly because of the increased hassle associated with flying due to less
privacy and longer check-in times.
295 Once again, this value is pure speculation on my part and does not pretend
to be derived scientifically. As with the projected values assigned to each specific
type of harm, the mathematical accuracy of these numbers is entirely beside the
point; these numbers merely provide a baseline for illustrating the concepts at
work.
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As the graph also demonstrates, there is no single type of harm risked
whose projected dollar value exceeds the projected burden placed upon the
airlines by disallowing two-inch blades. Accordingly, if the airlines are able
to convince the jury to view the type of harm risked by allowing two-inch
blades on planes very narrowly, then the jury will likely conclude that the
airlines are not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' damages.
2. Plaintiffs'Argument
Plaintiffs' incentive will be to convince the jury to view the type of
harm risked by allowing two-inch blades onto planes at a broad level of
generality.296 As demonstrated in Part I, whether or not United and/or
American breached a duty of care in the first instance depends upon
whether the risk blocks in the preceding graph,297 when stacked upon one
another, exceed the B=PL line.298
GRAPH 30:
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296 See supra notes
297 See Graph 29.
298 See Graph 30.
137-52 and accompanying text.
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As depicted in the graph, stacking all of the risk blocks upon one
another results in a finding of breach. The inquiry would necessarily then
focus upon how many of the risk blocks should be stacked when determin-
ing proximate cause. Characterizing the type of harm risked as personal
injury or property damage to others caused by the use of a blade would
arguably encompass all ten of the risks listed above, resulting in the
proximate cause risk block being the same as the breach block.2 99 This type
of stacking would result in a finding that the airlines not only breached a
duty of care, but also that they were a proximate cause of the injuries.
3. Who Will Prevail?
Based upon the above arguments, it is conceivable that either the
airlines or the plaintiffs could prevail on the proximate cause question.
Who should prevail? Which level of generality is the correct level at which
to view this question? As discussed earlier, there is no correct answer. °0
Like most questions of fact, the ultimate conclusion reached by a jury will
depend on the quality of the lawyering and the jury's rough sense ofjustice,
taking into account the sympathies of the case. The side likely to prevail on
this issue will be the side that is best able to convince the jury of how
narrowly or broadly to view the type of harm risked. In graphic terms, the
prevailing side will be the one with which the jury agrees on how much or
how little stacking of the individual risk blocks is appropriate. The more
varied the types of harm the jury envisions, the more likely the jury will be
to find for the airlines. In contrast, the more monolithic the jury envisions
the types of harm risked, the more likely the plaintiffs will be to prevail.
For example, if the jury decides that the appropriate level of generality
at which to view the types of harm risked is personal bodily injury, then
most, but not all, of the hypothesized types of harm would be considered.
In such a case, three of the risk blocks from the previous graph would be
unstacked, but the rest would remain stacked.30'
2. See id.
31 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
301 See Graph 3 1.
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GRAPH 31:
Risks of Harm
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As depicted in the graph, even when the tray table risk block, the
emotional disturbance risk block, and the unscheduled landing risk block
are unstacked, the remaining personal bodily injury risk block still exceeds
the B=PL line. Accordingly, adopting this fairly broad level of generality
would result in a finding that the airlines were a proximate cause of the
plaintiffs' injuries.
On the other hand, if the jury decides that the appropriate level of
generality at which to view the type of harm risked is an airplane crash,
then most of the hypothesized types of harm would not be considered. In
such a case, seven of the risk blocks would be unstacked, leaving only three
still stacked." 2
302 See Graph 32.
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As depicted in the graph, when only the three individual crash blocks
remain stacked, the resulting risk block fails to reach the B=PL line.
Accordingly, adopting this fairly narrow level of generality would result in
a finding that the airlines were not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs
injuries.
CONCLUSION
The Restatement Third's proposed chapter on the scope of liability
materially advances the quest for an understandable and conceptually sound
proximate cause analysis. Section 29 offers a simple, straightforward test
that accurately reflects the reason for imposing a limit on the scope of an
actor's liability as part of our tort system. An actor should be liable only for
the type of harm the risk of which made the actor's conduct tortious in the
first place. This test substantially mirrors the approach Justice Cardozo
followed to determine whether an actor's conduct was properly deemed to
be a breach of a duty of care.
The Restatement Third approach to proximate cause can also be
illustrated graphically by using Judge Learned Hand's B<PL equation as
(PROPOSED) RESTATEMENT THIRD OF TORTS
the tool. Under the B<PL formula, an actor breaches a duty of care when
the probability of causing harm risked by certain conduct multiplied by the
gravity of harm risked exceeds the burden to the actor of not engaging in
that conduct. This breach determination cumulates all of the types of harm
risked by the conduct at issue. The proximate cause analysis simply
deconstructs the breach analysis into its building blocks and evaluates each
block independently. Therefore, if at the time of the actor's conduct, the
probability of causing the type of harm actually suffered multiplied by the
gravity of that type of harm exceeds the burden to the actor of not engaging
in the conduct, then the actor is properly deemed to be a proximate cause
of the injury suffered.
Section 33's proposal to replace the traditional analysis when
evaluating whether an intervening act will be deemed to be a superseding
cause with a straightforward application of Section 29 is also preferable.
Changes in substantive law, such as the widespread modification of joint
and several liability and nearly uniform adoption of comparative fault,
render the traditional analysis virtually obsolete. In addition, focusing on
the foreseeability of the type of harm suffered rather than on the foresee-
ability of the intervening act more truly reflects the purpose of proximate
cause. This shift in focus can be illustrated graphically using the B<PL
formula. This formula can then be applied to any factual scenario, including
the facts of September 1 lth, to ascertain whether the scope of liability
limitations operate to relieve a party of ultimate liability for harm caused.
Applying the historical approach to intervening acts and superseding
causes to the facts of September 1 1th would lead to victory for the airlines
because the hijacking of the planes was an intentional, culpable act and
would thus be deemed unforeseeable as a matter of law. If the traditional
approach were applied, the result would depend upon whether or not the
jury found the hijacking of the planes to be foreseeable. Finally, whether
applying the Restatement Third approach to the facts of September 1 th
would lead a jury to find in favor of the plaintiffs or the airlines would
depend upon the level of generality at which the jury viewed the harm
risked by allowing individuals to board a plane carrying two-inch blades.
The more narrowly the jury viewed the type of harm risked, the more likely
it would be that the airlines would prevail. Likewise, the more broadly the
jury viewed the type of harm risked, the more likely it would be that the
plaintiffs would prevail.
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